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Working on this book has truly been an honour. It has been a voyage
into a period (WWII) that arguably is the historical period that has
most shaped the Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF). However, first
and foremost, it has been a journey into the history of one of the most
influential officers of the RNoAF, Lieutenant General (retired) Wil-
helm Mohr.
In early December 2008, 91-year-old Wilhelm Mohr was standing in
front of a Spitfire at the Norwegian Air Force Museum in Bodø, Nor-
way, lecturing cadets from the RNoAF Academy. For two hours one
could almost hear a needle drop as the cadets listened to Mohr describ-
ing his experiences during WWII. Later that night, the cadets and a
handful of RNoAF generals – including Wilhelm Mohr – had dinner
inside the museum. Above the table, suspended from the ceiling, was a
Fokker CV – the aircraft type Mohr was flying when Germany attacked
Norway on 9 April 1940 (although in April 1940, he flew a model dating
from 1924). In fact, several of the aircraft Mohr had flown surrounded
us, including a Spitfire, of which Mohr says: ’It was an admirable air-
craft – loved by pilots as well as ground crews’.1 After dinner, Wilhelm
Mohr asked me if I was interested in some written material he had at
the hotel where he was staying. Naturally, I was, so we took a taxi back
to his hotel, where he then provided me with three of the five articles
that make up the core of this small book.
The aim of this book is to provide a publication that adequately
covers the writings on WWII by Lieutenant General (r) Wilhelm
Mohr. By summarizing his thoughts I hope to not only contribute
to expanding the understanding of the man and his influence during
WWII, but also to provide some knowledge of and insight into perhaps
the most fascinating part of RNoAF history.
1 Wilhelm Mohr, telephone conversation with the author, 20 May 2009.
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Four of the five articles in this book have previously been published
in various books, booklets and articles. The first article, The contribution
of the Norwegian Air Forces, was written for a colloquium that was held
at Oxford University, 25–27 September 1991, on ’Anglo-Norwegian
Relations during the Second World War’. It was first published in the
book Britain and Norway in the Second World War (1995),2 and later as
an article in Air Power History (1997).3 The version in the present book
is the original text prepared for the 1991 colloquium at Oxford Uni-
versity. The second article, The ground crews’ participation in the war on
the Continent 1944/45, was published by the Norwegian War Disabled
Association in 1985, and was translated into English by the author.4
The third article, Friends and allies: a wartime memoir was published in a
booklet titled Britain & Norway: A Very Special Relationship, which com-
memorated the state visit to Norway of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth
II, 30 May – 1 June 2001.5 The fourth article, 9 April – From the past to
the future, is based on a lecture given by Lieutenant General (r) Wilhelm
Mohr at a seminar titled ’The fight for freedom’s place in Norwegian
history’, held in Oslo on 17 November 1997. It was later published by
the Norwegian War Disabled Association in 1998, and was translated
into English by the author.6 The fifth article, An address to the Royal Nor-
wegian Air Force Academy on the fiftieth anniversary of the Royal Norwegian
2 Patrick Salmon (Ed.), Britain and Norway in the Second World War (London, Stationery
Office Books (TSO): 1995), pp. 83–96. The article is reproduced with the permission of
the Stationery Office Books (TSO) and under the terms of the Click-Use License.
3 Wilhelm Mohr, `The Contribution of the Norwegian Air Forces’, Air Power History 44
(1997), pp. 30–43.
4 Arve Lønnum, Ole Jacob Malm and Wilhelm Mohr, I kamp for Norge. Flyvåpenets bakke-
mannskaper på kontinentet 1944/45 (Oslo, A/S Teisen-Trykk: 1985 [Krigsinvalideforbun-
det]), pp. 27–36. The article is reproduced with the permission of the Norwegian War
Disabled Association.
5 Maurice Fraser (Ed.) Britain & Norway: A Very Special Relationship (London, Agenda Pub-
lishing Limited: 2001), pp. 48–49. The article is reproduced with the permission of the
British Embassy in Oslo. We have also sent a request for permission to Agenda Publishing
Limited, the publisher of the booklet, but we have not succeeded in receiving confirmation
that we may use the article.
6 Finn Pettersen (Ed.), Frihetskampens plass i Norges historie (Oslo, Haakon Arnesen A.S.:
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Air Force, is the only article that has not previously been published. It
was written in 1994, and was translated into English by the author.
It should be noted that all pictures and maps in the original texts have
been removed – partly because of copyright issues, and partly because I
have not had access to the pictures presented in these articles. All illus-
trations in this book – pictures, maps, reports – have been provided by
the author. The text in the first article, The contribution of the Norwegian
Air Forces, and the third article, Friends and allies: a wartime memoir has
been kept in its original form without any modifications, as it was orig-
inally written in English. In the other three articles, which have been
translated into English, I have tried to incorporate the formally correct
terminology for aircraft and squadrons in the few places where there
were any discrepancies. With one exception (footnote 31), all footnotes
have been provided by the author in order to elaborate upon or explain
events, individuals or issues that otherwise would make little sense to
a non-Norwegian reader and, I fear, to many of the new generation of
readers, regardless of their nationality.
Lieutenant General (r) Wilhelm Mohr has a somewhat sober nature,
and for years he has been reluctant to emphasize his own role in WWII
or his service in the RNoAF, neither on a personal level through a
biography, nor in other written works. He decided early on not to write
a book about his own experiences in WWII. He has, however, written
a number of articles and lectures on the war, and I would argue that
the five articles presented in this book form an adequate summing up
of these texts.
The present contribution is not in any way a detailed academic analy-
sis, narrative or collection of memoirs. Even so, by collecting and pres-
enting texts, pictures, maps and transcripts of various Norwegian squa-
drons’ historical war records during WWII, I hope this can be a small
but valuable contribution to understanding the history of the RNoAF
1998), Krigsinvaliden, No. 1/1998, pp. 131–144. The article is reproduced with the per-
mission of the Norwegian War Disabled Association.
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Preface
and the importance, contributions and service of Wilhelm Mohr – the
man who in recent years has often and rightfully been described as ’the
grand old man of the RNoAF’.7
Dag Henriksen
Trondheim, June 2009
7 Wilhelm Mohr commented on the term `the grand old man of the RNoAF’, which he
felt was better suited to Major General Georg Jacob Falch Bull (1892–1977). According
to Mohr, Bull was a Norwegian flight pioneer who had undertaken his flight training in
France during the final year of WWI (1918). He was Commander of Nordenfjeldske and
Trøndelag Air Unit. Mohr first met him on an exercise in Trøndelag in 1937 and describes
him as a very visible and compassionate leader who treated all categories of personnel alike.
During WWII he served at both the Norwegian Defence Forces HQ and the Department
of Defence in London. After WWII he served as Commander of Air Command Østlan-
det. Bull retired in 1953. Thus, Wilhelm Mohr suggested, with a laugh, that he himself
perhaps instead could be the `grand old man of the new generation’. Wilhelm Mohr, tele-
phone conversation with the author, 20 May 2009; Wilhelm Mohr, short biography of
Major General Bull, accessible on <http://www.oslomilsamfund.no/Galleriet/Wordfiler-
portr-biografi/Bull_Georg.doc> downloaded May 2009.
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ForewordForeword
The Royal Norwegian Air Force has a proud history, of which I have
been privileged to have lived through a significant part.
From earlier times, Norway had both a Naval and an Army Air Force,
and I witnessed their unification during WWII. During this period I
saw the increasing role played by airpower in all military activity – a
process that continues to be under constant development.
The basis of our future progress lies in the ability of dedicated, com-
petent and well-trained personnel to master the demanding complexity
of essential technology. During my tenure, I became increasingly con-
cerned that – however well deserved – the experience of those good
people involved in the war should not be regarded as the fount of all
wisdom or provide the only guidelines for sound future development,
nor would it represent adequate guidance or assistance towards the two
other services and the national defence establishment as a whole.
Therefore, our Air Force Doctrine HFL 95-1 of 1969 must be seen
in the light that adequate leadership should always benefit from the ex-
perience of a competent younger generation, well trained and provided
with the most modern equipment on hand.
It is my hope that such considerations will prevail in the future.
Wilhelm Mohr
Lieutenant General (r)
Oslo, 20 May 2009
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Mohr at Lesja Woods Lake
Mohr leaves for Scotland
Mohr left for Scotland from Molde on 2 May 
1940, together with Major Øen. The city had 
been bombed by the Germans and was burning 
when they left. A German bomber attacked them, 
and they had to steer the fishing boat zigzag to 
the shoreline outside Molde. The boat sank, but 
they found another and set course for Scotland.
Reconnaissance Wing at Selbu
When the Wing reached Selbu, 
they saw a stream of German air-
craft heading for Værnes. Because 
of easy road access between 
Stjørdal and Selbu, they knew they 
could not stay there, and flew 
down to Aursunden. 
Reconnaissance
Wing at Aursunden
Because they learned that an 
army unit had established 
some sort of HQ at Røros, 
they flew down to the west 
side of Aursund Lake. Mohr 
took command of the Wing 
on 13 April 1940 — at 22 
years old. They operated 
from there until later that 
month, performing re-con-
naissance missions to map 
out the German advances on 
the ground. Assessing the 
Wing’s operations, Mohr 
himself — in his usual mod-
est way — said ‘I would not 
say it had any signi cant 
usefulness.’
Mohr’s emergency landing at Fokkstua
By late April, it became clear that South 
Norway would have to be surrendered to the 
German forces, and it was decided that each 
pilot could choose if they wanted to continue 
their fight against the Germans in North 
Norway, or go to Lesja to start preparing for 
the journey over to the UK and continue the 
fight from there. Mohr chose Lesja. By now, 
the Germans had advanced to Tynset. On his 
low-level flight towards Lesja from Aursun-
den, a german bullet went through the wing 
of his Fokker, and petrol started to pour out 
of it. He performed an emergency landing 
just north of Fokkstua. After fixing the air-
craft and getting fuel by snow-sledge, he set 
course for Lesja.
Reconnaissance Wing at Værnes
Lieutenant Wilhelm Mohr was Depu-
ty Commander of the Reconnaissance 
Wing of Trøndelag Air Unit at 
Værnes. The Wing numbered nine 
Fokker aircraft, a model from 1924. 
The alert of the German attack sound-
ed at 03:30 on the morning of 9 April 
1940. They knew operations from 
Værnes would be impossible, so they 
put skis on the airplanes to enable 
operations off base, and took off for 
Selbu. 
On 24 April 1940, Mohr landed on Lesja Woods Lake 
to link up with Major Øen, who had established an 
HQ for the remnants of the Air Force at Lesja. Mohr 
landed shortly after the British 263 Sqn. of 18 Gladia-
tors had been attacked on the lake, of which 13 were 
destroyed. Once landed, he spotted three German 
Heinkels heading for his Fokker. He jumped out of the 
aircraft, only to find himself in deep snow, unable to 
move. The Heinkels made three runs, but missed 
Mohr and the Fokker. He managed to re-enter the air-
craft and take it to a more secure location.
Mohr meets General Ruge (ChoD)
at Otta
Upon meeting Major Øen, Mohr was sent to 
the commanding general to seek approval of 
the plan to leave for the UK to start training 
there. He was said to be ‘somewhere in the 
Gudbrands Valley’. Mohr found General 
Ruge on a farm close to Otta, and discussed 
the issue for about an hour. Ruge told him 
that the British forces would have to be 
withdrawn from South Norway. Over-
whelming German airpower would make 
reinforcement and supplies impossible. The 
King, the government, and he himself would 
shortly leave for North Norway. The plan to 
go to the UK was approved. Ruge told Mohr 
that it was important to make ‘identi able 
Norwegian units’ in the Allied effort to fight 
the Germans, as it would be important when 
the reckoning after the war was to be made.
100 Kilometres500
0 100 Miles 50 
Figure 1: Map – Wilhelm Mohr, April 1940.
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Lieutenant General (r) Wilhelm Mohr was born in Bergen, Norway,
in 1917. His interest in aviation came early. He entered service in the
Army Air Arm in 1936 when he joined the Army Air Arm Flight School
at Kjeller (1936–1937). He subsequently entered the Army Academy
(1937–1939) to study engineering.8 Later, he received news that he
had been offered at place at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) in Boston, but due to the situation in Europe, this could not be
utilized. Mohr was posted to the Trøndelag Air Unit at Værnes in 1939,
where he met his future wife, Jonna Melandsø. He was Deputy Com-
mander of the Reconnaissance Wing9 in the Trøndelag Air Unit when
Germany attacked Norway on 9 April 1940. This short biography will
focus on Mohr’s experiences during WWII.10
When the German attack alert sounded at 03:30 on the morning of
9 April 1940, it was obvious that operations from Værnes would be
impossible. Consequently, skis were fitted to the airplanes to enable
operations off base, and the Reconnaissance Wing took off for Selbu.
Upon reaching Selbu, they saw a stream of German aircraft heading for
Værnes. They therefore continued down to Aursunden because they
8 Wilhelm Mohr, telephone conversation with the author, 20 May 2009.
9 The Norwegian term `Ving’ is used in the original version, which transliterates as `Wing’.
The term `Wing’ is used in Mohr’s original texts throughout this book, and I have there-
fore chosen to keep this term. However, given the size of the unit (nine Fokker aircraft), it
would probably be more correct to use the term `Squadron’ when translating `Ving’ into
English, or perhaps the more generic term `Unit’.
10 This short biography is based on Wilhelm Mohr’s own unpublished memoirs: Wilhelm
Mohr. Erindringer [Wilhelm Mohr. Recollections], Oslo 27 June 2007. Historical details have
been checked against the official history of the Royal Norwegian Air Force: Vera Henrik-
sen (1994) Luftforsvarets Historie. Bind 1. Fra opptakt til nederlag (juni 1912 – juni 1940) [The
History of the Royal Norwegian Air Force. Volume 1. From the Beginning to Defeat (June 1912 –
June 1940)], Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co (W. Nygaard); Vera Henriksen (1996) Historie. Bind
2. Fem år i utlegd (juni 1940 – mai 1945) [The History of the Royal Norwegian Air Force. Vol-
ume 2. Five Years Abroad (June 1940 – May 1945)], Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co (W. Nygaard).
Facts have also been checked against the Norsk Biografisk Leksikon [Norwegian Biographical
Encyclopedia] (2003) Oslo: Kunnskapsforlaget, H. Aschehoug & Co (W. Nygaard) A/S and
Gyldendal ASA, Volume 6, pp. 336–337. Finally, Wilhelm Mohr has himself read through
and commented upon this biography.
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had learned that an army unit had established some form of HQ at
Røros. There, in the rather chaotic atmosphere of rumours and friction
of war, Mohr took command of the Wing on 13 April, at the age of 22.
They operated from there until later that month, performing recon-
naissance missions to map out the German advances on the ground.
Assessing the Wing’s operations, Mohr himself – in his usual sober
manner – said: ’I would not say it had any significant usefulness’.11
By late April it had become clear that South Norway would have to be
surrendered to the German forces, and it was decided that each pilot
could choose whether they wanted to continue their fight against the
Germans in North Norway, or go to Lesja to start preparing for the
journey over to the UK and then continue the fight from there. Mohr
chose Lesja. By then, the Germans had advanced to Tynset, and on
Mohr’s low-level flight towards Lesja from Aursunden, a German bul-
let went through the wing of his Fokker and petrol started to poor out,
forcing Mohr to make an emergency landing just north of Fokkstua.
After making necessary repairs to the aircraft and procuring fuel by
sledge – he set course for Lesja. Mohr landed on Lesjaskogsvannet
(Lesja Woods Lake) on 24 April, in order to link up with (then) Cap-
tain Bjarne Øen,12 who had established an HQ for the remnants of the
Norwegian Air Arm at Lesja. Mohr landed shortly after 18 Gladiators
of the British 263 Squadron had been attacked on the lake, 13 of which
were destroyed. Once landed, he spotted three German Heinkels head-
ing for him and his Fokker. He jumped out of the aircraft, only to find
himself in deep snow and unable to escape. The Heinkels made three
11 Wilhelm Mohr, Recollections, unpublished memoirs, Oslo 27 June 2007, p. 32.
12 Adolf Bjarne Øen (1898–1994) is one of the leading figures of the Royal Norwegian Air
Force. He became the Inspector General of the Army Air Arm on 13 April 1940 – four
days after Germany attacked Norway. He played a key role in building up the Norwegian
Air Force in Britain during WWII, and later – as Chief of the RNoAF – in developing the
RNoAF as a separate service after the War. Øen held a number of key positions in his ca-
reer, and became Chief of Defence in 1963. Norsk Biografisk Leksikon [The Norwegian Bio-
graphical Encyclopedia] (2005) Oslo: Kunnskapsforlaget, H. Aschehoug & Co (W. Nygaard)
A/S and Gyldendal ASA, Volume 10, pp. 92–93.
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runs, but missed Mohr and the Fokker. Mohr managed to re-enter his
aircraft and taxi it to a more secure location.
Upon meeting Captain Øen, Mohr was sent to the commanding
general of the Norwegian Forces to seek approval for the plan to leave
for the UK with a hopeful ambition to re-equip for later operations in
North Norway. The General was said to be ’somewhere in Gudbrands-
dalen’. Mohr found General Ruge on a farm close to Otta, and they
both discussed the issue – and as Mohr points out: ’it was quite an ex-
perience for a 22-year-old lieutenant’.13 Ruge told him that the British
forces would have to be withdrawn from South Norway. Overwhelming
German airpower would make reinforcement and supplies impossible.
The King, the government and he himself were shortly due to leave
for North Norway. The plan to go to the UK was approved. Ruge told
Mohr that it was important to make ’identifiable Norwegian units’ in
the Allied effort to fight the Germans, as it would be important when
the reckoning after the war was to be made.
Mohr left for Scotland from Molde on 2 May 1940, together with
Captain Øen and other personnel. The city had been bombed by the
Germans and was burning when they left. A German bomber attacked
them, and they had to steer a zigzag course in their fishing boat towards
the shoreline outside Molde. Unfortunately, the boat sank, but they
found another and set course for the UK.
Once in England, Mohr departed for the Norwegian training camp
’Little Norway’ in Toronto, Canada. Mohr became the first flight
instructor at the camp, educating personnel who wanted to establish
Norwegian air units in the UK. He was also given the job as test pilot
of the Curtiss and Douglas aircraft acquired from the Americans. He
left Canada on 17 May 1941 – the national day of Norway – for oper-
ational duties in the UK, where the first Norwegian fighter squadron
(331 (Norwegian) Sqn.) was about to be established (21 July 1941). Rec-
ognizing the need for experienced leadership when the second fighter
squadron was to be established, Mohr was posted to Royal Air Force
13 Wilhelm Mohr, telephone conversation with the author, 20 May 2009.
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615 Sqn. which was performing missions along the French coast. He
was soon promoted to Flight Commander by the Royal Air Force
because – as the promotion read – he had performed ’remarkably well
in action’. In his usual manner, Mohr has commented on this reason for
his promotion as follows: ’I had no sense of being any more «remark-
able» than several others at the squadron.’14 Among other operations,
Mohr participated in the attack on the battle cruisers Gneisenau and
Scharnhorst at Brest harbour on 18 December 1941.
In January 1942, Mohr became Deputy Commander and Flight
Commander of the second Norwegian fighter squadron (332 (N) Sqn.)
at Catterick (England), and a few months later (April) he assumed com-
mand of the squadron. In June, 332 Squadron joined 331 Squadron at
North Weald just north of London, which was equipped with Spitfire
aircraft. Among various operations, Mohr took part in ’Dieppe Day’ on
19 August 1942, when the two Squadrons were to provide air superior-
ity in an effort to probe the German defences for the later invasion. 331
Squadron shot down six German aircraft and probably an additional
three, while losing three of their own aircraft. 332 Squadron shot down
eight German aircraft, and damaged several others, but lost two of their
own aircraft. The results were better than those of any other Wing par-
ticipating. Mohr was wounded when a bullet that had lost most of its
energy went through his boot and ankle.15 Of the episode, Alf R. Bjercke
writes in his book Back-up of a Rich Life that he noticed blood coming
from a hole in Mohr’s boot. He silently alerted the Squadron’s doctor
who came and told Mohr to take off his boot. He was ordered to take
off his boot, and according to Bjercke, it was found to be ’filled with
blood’. Mohr had to be ordered to the camp’s medical facilities.16
Mohr was wounded later, on 31 July 1942, when a grenade fired by
14 Wilhelm Mohr, Recollections, unpublished memoirs, Oslo 27 June 2007, p. 44.
15 Wilhelm Mohr was awarded the British Distinguished Flying Cross and the Norwegian
War Cross for his service on `Dieppe-Day’.
16 Alf R. Bjercke, Back-up av et rikt liv [Back-up of a Rich Life ] (Oslo, Andresen & Butenschøn:
2001), p. 120.
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a German Focke Wulf hit the left cannon of his plane. He managed to
stay airborne and crash landed at North Weald (Essex, England), but
a grenade fragment had passed through his oxygen mask and cheek,
removing one of his teeth.
On 27 November 1942 Wilhelm Mohr married Jonna Melandsø in
London. After the German attack in April 1940, Jonna Melandsø had
worked as an illegal courier but had had to escape from Norway to Swe-
den in the autumn of 1941. Upon arriving in Sweden, she then started
to work as a secretary for the Norwegian Defence Attaché. She arrived
in England one year later, where she was employed as a secretary for
Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen17 in London (It should be noted that she later
was nominated as godmother of 332 (N) Squadron).18 Bjarne Øen, the
man that Mohr had travelled to Lesja to meet on 24 April 1940, was
’best man’ at Mohr’s wedding. Mohr and Jonna Melandsø were to have
three children together.
In accordance with RAF tradition, upon fulfilling about 200 hours of
operational flying, a pilot was taken out of operational duty for a period
of time – a so-called ’rest’. When Mohr’s time had come, he was ordered
in as Head of Personnel at the Air Force Joint Headquarters. Mohr did
not look forward to the assignment, but even so on 22 February 1943
he left 332 Squadron. The same day he learned that his brother, Conrad
Mohr, had been killed in a flying accident at the Air Force’s training
camp ’Little Norway’ in Canada.
By the autumn of 1943, it had become clear that the RAF wanted a
Norwegian Wing to participate in a future Allied invasion. Accordingly,
331 and 332 Squadrons were combined into 132 (Norwegian) Airfield
on 1 November 1943, and Mohr, whose ’rest’ period was over by then,
was ordered to be administrative leader of the Wing.
On D-Day, 6 June 1944, Mohr flew with the Wing in the morning,
and has described the situation as follows:
17 Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen (1890–1965) became the first Commander-in-Chief of the Royal
Norwegian Air Force, when the Army and Navy Air Arms were joined to form a separate
service on 10 November 1944.
18 Wilhelm Mohr, telephone conversation with the author, 19 June 2009.
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The impression stays overwhelming. It was like a page in history was turned …
What a sight. The ocean beneath us was filled with various ships, everyone heading
south, war ships that bombarded in advance, amphibious ships on the beaches and
on their way, merchant ships ready to supply all kinds of material. It struck me
that if you needed to jump out of the aircraft at the time – chances were good you
would land on a ship’s deck.19
According to Wilhelm Mohr, they met no resistance in the air. The
Allied struggle for air supremacy had been successful, and without
that, no invasion could have taken place.20 Subsequently, the Wing’s
role was altered from air-to-air to air-to-ground operations. The tar-
gets were German defences in the landing area, attacking all German
movement in the area, and there were also interdict operations to stop
German reinforcements. Soon, all ground personnel could be moved
across the Channel, and operations continued as Allied ground forces
consolidated their bridgeheads in the landing area. Starting at the B16
Airfield outside Caen, France, the Wing moved north-eastwards as the
Allied front moved north-eastwards – into northern France, Belgium,
the Netherlands and up to the German border.
While in Belgium, Mohr was informed that the Norwegian author-
ities in London had joined the Army and Navy Air Forces under one
command as a separate service – effectively establishing the Royal Nor-
wegian Air Force on 10 November 1944. Mohr thought it an important
step forward, but comments that at the time it did not affect them much
– the focus was set on providing an effective contribution to the Allied
progress and everyday flying with the objective of attacking German
forces.
The last airfield that the Wing operated from was Airfield B106 at
Twente, close to the German border. The war was coming to an end.
On Liberation Day, 8 May 1945, Mohr was in Antwerp, leading 132
19 Wilhelm Mohr, Recollections, unpublished memoirs, Oslo 27 June 2007, p. 71.
20 Wilhelm Mohr, telephone conversation with the author, 20 May 2009.
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(N) Wing’s ground personnel car convoy from Airfield B106. Fourteen
days later he was back home in Norway.21
After WWII, Mohr was aide-de-camp to King Haakon VII
(1946-49). He played an important role in building up the newly-estab-
lished Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF), and served in various
postings in the RNoAF in the 1950s – including three years in Wash-
ington as Norway’s representative on NATO’s Military Committee.22
Mohr became Chief of Staff of the Air Force in 1960. He became Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Air Force in 1963, and among other things he
played a key role in inducing the development of the first RNoAF doc-
trine after WWII in the late 1960s. In 1969 Lieutenant General Wil-
helm Mohr became Deputy Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces
Northern Europe, and later Director of the National Defence College
in Oslo.
Upon retirement in 1975, he took up activities within natural
resources management, including fish farming, which in those days was
in its infancy.23 Mohr became Head of the Norwegian Civil Aviation
Accident Commission 1977–1989.24
Lieutenant General Wilhelm Mohr has received a number of dec-
orations for his military service, including the War Cross with Sword
(Norway), The Order of St. Olav (Norway), The Distinguished Flying
Cross (Britain), and The Legion of Merit (US).25
Today, Lieutenant General Wilhelm Mohr lives in Oslo and regu-
larly visits the RNoAF Academy in Trondheim, giving his reflections
on WWII and the history of the RNoAF to the young cadets – and
how these experiences might translate into wisdom for the challenges
21 On a personal note, Wilhelm Mohr and two friends were staying at a hotel in Hamburg
together with the Canadian 7 Armoured Division when he learned that the Germans had
signed the capitulation documents on 5 May 1945. Thus, as Mohr says: `People have asked
me where I was when the War ended. I tell them Hamburg’. Ibid, p. 81.
22 Wilhelm Mohr, telephone conversation with the author, 19 June 2009.
23 Ibid.
24 Wilhelm Mohr, telephone conversation with the author, 20 May 2009.
25 Wilhelm Mohr (1997) `The Contributions of the Norwegian Air Forces in World War
II’, Air Power History 44 (1997), p. 32. The Norwegian Biographical Encyclopedia (2003) Oslo:
Kunnskapsforlaget, H. Aschehoug & Co (W. Nygaard) A/S and Gyldendal ASA, Volume
6, p. 336.
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facing officers today and in the future. For his dedication towards the
new generation of officers in general, and the cadets at the RNoAF
Academy in particular, he was awarded the status of ’honorary cadet’
by the Academy’s cadets in 1999.
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Picture from Aursunden in the middle of April 1940. Mohr had just assumed command of
the Reconnaissance Wing, and managed to persuade a native Sami to have his flock of some
three thousand reindeer to stamp the deep snow in preparation for the airfield the Wing
would operate from.
Wilhelm Mohr at North Weald on 24 July 1942. That day Crown Prince Olav (later King
Olav V) visited North Weald, and Wilhelm Mohr was promoted to the rank of Major.
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Wilhelm Mohr (right) together with Helge Mehre (left) at North Weald in early summer
1942. Helge Mehre commanded 331 (N) Squadron from January to September 1942, was
Wing Commander for 132 (N) Wing from May to August 1943, and Wing Commander
for 132 (N) Airfield from November 1943 to August 1944 (and from February 1945
until the end of WWII). After the war he held a number of high positions, among them
Commander of Air Command South Norway and later as Norway’s representative in
NATO’s Military Committee.26
26 The Norwegian Biographical Encyclopedia (2003) Oslo: Kunnskapsforlaget, H. Aschehoug &
Co (W. Nygaard) A/S and Gyldendal ASA, Volume 6, pp. 258–259, and Vera Henriksen
(1996) The History of the Royal Norwegian Air Force. Volume 2. Five Years Abroad (June 1940
– May 1945), Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co (W. Nygaard) p. 559.
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Wilhelm Mohr (right) together with Odd Bull (left) at Catterick. Mohr believes the picture
was taken when 332 (N) Squadron was established in January 1942. Odd Bull participated
in building up Camp ’Little Norway’, and was later Commander for both 331 (N) and 332
(N) Squadrons during WWII. After the war he held a number of high positions, among
them Commander of Air Command North Norway and later Chairman of the Cease Fire
Commission in the Middle East, 1963–1970.27
27 The Norwegian Biographical Encyclopedia (2000) Oslo: Kunnskapsforlaget, H. Aschehoug &
Co (W. Nygaard) A/S and Gyldendal ASA, Volume 2, pp. 82–83.
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Wilhelm Mohr (standing, smoking pipe) together with the pilots of 332 (N) Squadron.
Asked to comment on the picture, Mohr suggested the following subtext: `«The gang», our
mascot «Mads», and our beloved Spitfire’
24
Wilhelm Mohr receives the Norwegian War Cross from King Haakon VII at North Weald
on 5 September 1942. As a consequence of being wounded in his leg on ’Dieppe Day’, he
had to wear a slipper to conceal his plastered foot.
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In the Operations Record Book for North Weald the following entry was made on 4 September
1942: ’… The Norwegians were in high spirits, pending the visit of their King and Crown
Prince who, accompanied by the Crown Princess and other high officials, are arriving tomorrow to
present the NORWEGIAN WAR CROSS to MAJORS MAEHRE, MOHR and
BIRKSTEAD’. This picture was taken after the award ceremony where His Majesty King
Haakon VII of Norway had presented Majors Mehre, Mohr and Birksted with the Norwegian
War Cross. From left: Major Helge Mehre, H.R.H. Crown Princess Märtha, H.M. King
Haakon VII, Major Wilhelm Mohr, H.R.H. Crown Prince Olav, Major Kaj Birksted.
Wilhelm Mohr (left) together with Major Mehre (centre) and Major Birksted (right) after
receiving the War Cross from King Haakon VII of Norway in September 1942. Mohr was 25
years old at the time.
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From left: Lieutenant Colonel Helge Mehre, H.R.H. Crown Prince Olav, Major Wilhelm
Mohr and Lieutenant Colonel Rolf Arne Berg studying 132 (N) Wing’s stockpile of bombs
at Grimbergen in 1944.
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Above is the ’individual combat report’ by Wilhelm Mohr on 19. August
1942 – referred to as ’Dieppe Day’. Since the text is a bit blurred, the
’general report’ is repeated below:
GENERAL REPORT (R) I flew as yellow 1. Short while after the Squad-
ron arrived at Dieppe, a dogfight took place. I went in to attack a F.W. 190
[Focke-Wulf Fw 190] on port quarter, the range about 200 yards. I with-
held the fire, closing to ca. 100 yds, and was just about to open fire on point
blank, the a/c taking no evasive action, so I was hit from behind, one bullet
going into my right leg. The a/c which had hit me fired from unexpected
long range. I had seen it coming but did not expect him to start firing that
early. I took a sharp left turn and got away. I continued in the area till the
Sqdr. went home, taking part in several dogfights. I claim nothing.28
Figure 2: ’Individual Combat Report’ by Wilhelm Mohr – ’Dieppe Day’, 19.08.1942
28 Royal Air Force, Individual Combat Report, 19 August 1942, Major Wilhelm Mohr, 332
(N) Squadron, Operations Record Book, Appendices, Appendix 2, August 1942, p. 13. For the
record, it should be noted that Wilhelm Mohr insisted on removing one Combat Report
(when he was wounded on 31 July 1942) and was somewhat sceptical about including this
Combat Report (Dieppe Day) because the missions were – as he put it – `non-productive’
regarding the enemy. However, Mohr allowed this Combat Report (Dieppe Day) to be
presented in this book only because it `indicates the way of life at the squadrons at that
time’. Wilhelm Mohr, telephone conversation with the author, 20 May 2009.
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The Contribution of the Norwegian Air Forces
By Wilhelm Mohr
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From a small nucleus of Servicemen that arrived in the UK after the
war in Norway, the Navy and Army elements were soon enabled to
establish a recruitment and training centre in Canada. Through this
organisation flowed an increasing stream of aircrew and technicians to
man newly-created Norwegian fighting units under the control of the
Royal Air Force:
330 (N) and 333 (N) Squadrons in Costal Command
331 (N) and 332 (N) Squadrons in Fighter Command
(later as 132 (N) Wing in the Second Tactical Air Force)
R(No)AF / 45 Group of Transportation Command.
In addition individual aircrew served in RAF squadrons of all com-
mands, as well as in training elements and even staff assignments. A
special unit alongside British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC)
provided transport for Norwegian personnel to and from Sweden.
In May 1945 the numbers totalled 505 officers and 2,133 NCOs OR. In
addition there were 63 Norwegian WAAFs. The Norwegian Air Forces
represented the second largest of the Allied Air Forces after Poland, es-
tablished outside their own occupied country. Only after North Africa
had been liberated did the French Air Force exceed that of Norway.
Total losses amounted to 278 aircrew members, which of combat-
ing strength represents: 33 per cent of the pilots, 24 per cent of the
navigators, 15 per cent of the wireless operators, 15 per cent of the air
gunners and 13 per cent of the flight engineers. In addition some were
wounded.
British decorations bestowed include 1 Knight Commander of The
Most Honourable Order of the Bath (KCB), 1 Companion of The Most
Honourable Order of the Bath (CB), 11 The Most Excellent Order of
the British Empire – Officer (OBE), 12 The Most Excellent Order of
the British Empire – Member (MBE), 7 Distinguished Service Order,
3 Distinguished Service Cross (DSC), 74 Distinguished Flying Cross
(DFC), 15 Distinguished Flying Cross’ with Bar, 1 Distinguished Fly-
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ing Cross with 2 Bars, 3 Air Force Cross (AFC), 6 Distinguished Fly-
ing Medal (DFM), 1 Air Force Medal (AFM), 1 Distinguished Service
Medal (DSM), 2 British Empire Medal (BEM) and 25 M in Ds.
PART I
The Early Endeavours
Before the war the Norwegian Army and Navy had their own air forces.
The remnants from both these forces arrived in the UK while the hos-
tilities were coming to an end and capitulation followed. At the outset
the naval side numbered 17 pilots, navigators and technical personnel
who brought with them four reconnaissance/torpedo seaplanes of type
Heinkel 115, one of which was captured, and also a captured German
Arado Ar 196. From the Army some 60 trained pilots were available,
including 4 with civil engineering background, plus some 25 mechanics,
radio and armament specialists.
Prior to the war the Norwegian Government had placed orders in the
USA for the Army Air Force for a total of 36 Curtiss 75 (fighters), and
36 Douglas 8A (reconnaissance/bombers) and for the Naval Air Force
24 Northrop N3PB reconnaissance and mine laying aircraft (seaplanes).
The delivery of the fighter aircraft had partly begun, though none was
ready for use when the Germans attacked Norway. Five en route were
in crates in Britain. The total order included spare engines and other
equipment. These aircraft were all considered very modern and of high
quality. The Army Air Force was in addition to receive from Italy 15
Caproni Ca 312 (bombers).
The contingent of personnel in Britain in the early summer of 1940
and the equipment that was under way formed the nucleus of a Nor-
wegian air force that could continue the war outside the country. Mean-
while in Norway the war was still going on. It could no longer be
sustained in South Norway, but the Norwegian Commander in Chief,
General Otto Ruge, instructed Captain Bjarne Øen (the senior Army
Air Force officer) to encourage trained personnel to go to the UK and
seek whatever assistance might be available to re-establish fighter units
for the Northern theatre.
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I must insert a personal note, because it actually fell on me at the time
to obtain and carry these instructions to Captain Øen. I recollect from
the conservation with General Ruge that he expressed doubts whether
North Norway could be held at all for the length of time required, but
emphasised for reasons of future national interest the importance that
any national contribution to the war, whatever it achieved, be clearly
identifiable.
Early endeavours and discussions in London
At the beginning of the war the Norwegian legation in London had no
military representation. In mid-April 1940 a post of Military and naval
attaché was created, and a month later a Military and Naval Mission was
established. This mission became the intermediary between the British
authorities and the very meagre Norwegian military headquarters of
that time. The British first made the offer of having Norwegian pilots
trained by the RAF in the same manner as their own «Volunteer Res-
erves». These pilots were then to be deployed into units already serving
in North Norway, or earmarked for that theatre. Five pilots commen-
ced such training.
Meanwhile the members of the Norwegian Naval Air service who
had arrived in the UK with their aircraft had established themselves as
a unit. Efforts were made to have this unit carry out operations with or
within the British Fleet Air Arm. This was soon deemed impractical,
mainly because of the type of aircraft involved. The element was there-
fore assigned to the RAF Experimental Establishment at Helensburgh
in Scotland, but was later disbanded (The aircraft were taken over by
the RAF, and were flown by Norwegian crews in clandestine operations
in North Africa, until destroyed by enemy air attacks on Malta).
Identifiable Norwegian Air Units?
Captain Øen and his small staff now addressed themselves to the poss-
ible establishment of identifiable Norwegian air units that would either
cooperate with the RAF, or be contained within it. It was soon made
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clear by the British that this was not feasible for a number of reasons:
Norwegian equipment was not compatible with that of the RAF and
furthermore depended on a cross-ocean supply line; no training facili-
ties could be made available in the UK; and the looming war-threat
to the UK set limits to such efforts. An alternative solution was then
sought vis-à-vis the French. They possessed the Curtiss P 36 fighters
in their inventory and were interested in the other types of Norwegian
aircraft as well. However, developments in France made this solution
impossible and by this time the campaign in Norway had come to an
end. An inquiry was made by the British whether Norway would now
let available pilots join British air units at the discretion of the British
authorities. Pending a decision, the training that had already begun for
the five pilots in the RAF was terminated.
The basis for these endeavours is set out in a Memorandum dated 17
June 1940 by Captain Bjarne Øen. In this Captain Øen say (my trans-
lation):
The arrangement now proposed by the British authorities must presumably be based
on a voluntary acceptance by each pilot, but this may not be deemed a recommended
solution to the Norwegian authorities. For the latter it must be considered of over-
riding importance to manifest towards the world and not least towards the people
of Norway now under occupation, that the struggle be continued within a national
framework. It is only in such perspective that our existence outside Norway can be
justified. Seen from outside, nothing much will be gained by letting our people join
individually within the Allied forces. It must be Norwegian units that can show our
colours, and that will stand identifiable when victory comes and settlement takes
place. The importance of this cannot be exaggerated and is deemed a necessity if we
are to hope that the will of resistance shall be upheld by the people at home μ
Thus his view, as expressed, followed closely that set forth by General
Ruge.
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Inactive pilots show signs of restlessness
Naturally – and Captain Øen makes the same point – the group of
inactive pilots in London at the time were becoming frustrated and
impatient. Their main wish was to get into the RAF and take their share
in the war as soon as possible.
Captain Øen concluded that, as France had now capitulated, Canada
offered the only opportunity for Norway to establish a training base in
order to raise identifiable Norwegian air units. Such a solution was to
be preferred.
The Government of Norway was by this time established in Lon-
don. Captain Øen’s proposal, supported by the Army Command, was
approved on 19 June. A similar arrangement for the training and fur-
nishing of naval air units was also approved. An aide memoire reflecting
this view was submitted to the British Government on 10 July 1940,
UK renders support. Camp «Little Norway» takes
shape.
It is fair to assume that the Norwegian proposal was not accepted by
the British without reluctance. At the time the British wanted as many
pilots as they could muster. Poles, Czechs, Belgians and Dutch were
already in service. They did, however, acquiesce, whereupon the British
Air Ministry gave the plan its full support.
All efforts were now focused on setting up a joint training establish-
ment in Canada. This became known as «Little Norway». Rapid prog-
ress was made. The camp was erected adjacent to the Island Airport in
the harbour area of Toronto. Elementary training aircraft of the type
Fairchild PT-19 and then PT-26 Cornell were acquired, and the oper-
ational aircraft on order, mentioned earlier, were delivered. The camp
was inaugurated on 10 November 1940. Personnel at that time num-
bered about 300. Most of the student pilots had escaped from Norway
via the UK or via Sweden and Russia (Siberia and the Pacific). Many of
the technical trainees were selected from the Merchant Marine and they
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were indeed to become the backbone of the future Royal Norwegian
Air Force. The clear objective was undoubtedly to bring fighting units
forward at the earliest possible time.
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Aerial photo of Camp «Little Norway» at Toronto. The airfield is outside the picture (to the
left). To the right, behind the row of buildings, part of the Maple Leaf Baseball stadium can be
seen.
The Norwegian joint training establishment in Canada, known as Camp «Little Norway», was
inaugurated on 10 November 1940 at Toronto Island Airport. Due to increasing activity the
training establishment outgrew the facilities at Toronto and the training establishment moved to
Muskoka Airport in North Ontario at the end of 1942.
Fresh pilots ready for the journey overseas from Camp «Little Norway».
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Fairchild PT-26 Cornell coming in to land at Toronto. The aircraft has not yet had
Norwegian insignia applied. A Curtiss H75A-8 Hawk and a Douglas 8-A can also be seen.
Ole Reistad took command of Camp «Little Norway» on 31 January 1941. Here he briefs
pilots at Camp «Little Norway» in spring/summer 1941. From left: Alf Widerberg, Tarald
Weisteen, Ole Reistad, Thor Wærner, Ingard Knudsen, Arne Austeen (KIA 4 May 45),
Eiliv Strømme (KIA 11 Oct 42), Jon Tvedte, Rolf Tradin (KIA 30 May 43), Christian
Fredrik Jean-Hansen (KIA 29 Aug 43).
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The Deliberations for Further Goals
Creation of a joint Air Forces HQ in London.
Purpose of Norwegian forces. British doubts about
Norwegian attitude. The planning proceeds.
In the meantime a joint HQ of the Army and Naval Air Force elements
was formed in London, presenting itself as the «Royal Norwegian Air
Forces HQ» within the Norwegian Armed Forces structure. This was a
practical measure for the benefit of its single Royal Air Force counter-
part, the Air Ministry. It functioned as an amalgamation of the two
elements into one single Service authority, although the organisational
ratification of this change was not carried out until much later.
This development did not signify that the RNAF HQ was indepen-
dently free to deal with its corresponding British authority (The same
applies to the Navy and Army). Some background information seems
appropriate here.
There is little doubt that the British regarded Norway as an Allied
nation. Our merchant fleet had already made an essential contribution
to the war effort. Yet we provided no fighting elements. The Norwegian
Government on foreign soil must undoubtedly have felt its position of
uncertainty and weakness, not least in regard to the occupied popu-
lation left behind. Thus its first stumbling efforts may well have left the
British uncertain whether a lingering attitude of ingrained Norwegian
neutralism still prevailed.
While these matters were deliberated on a political level, the estab-
lished Norwegian Defence Staff increasingly asserted its position as
a joint military planning authority. In accordance with Government
ambitions this pertained to acquiring national influence and particip-
ation in allied operations directed towards Norway, and in particular to
the coordinating of forces outside Norway with resistance movements
within the country. The overriding aim was to have maximum influence
in the process that could bring about the liberation of Norway.
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The Governmental Agreement of 28 May 1941.
Although the practical issues of establishing Norwegian Armed Forces
in Britain had already been set in motion, the formal Governmental
Agreement to regulate the relationship was not drawn up until 28 May
1941. This was signed by Mr. Anthony Eden and Mr. Trygve Lie, the
newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs succeeding Mr. Halvdan
Koht.
The gist of the Agreement lies in the formulation of Article 1, which
reflects the unified policy mentioned above:
The Norwegian Armed Forces in the United Kingdom shall be used
either for the defence of the United Kingdom or for the purpose of
regaining Norway. They shall be organised and employed under British
Command as the Armed Forces of the Kingdom of Norway allied with
the United Kingdom.
Thus the policy prevailed though by nature the Air Forces (and the
Navy) came to acquire more freedom in its exercise than the Army. The
question of command and control represented no specific problem, at
least not for units of the Air Forces.
The Agreement with some Appendices further regulates the question
of command and control and jurisdiction, as related to the Air Forces.
This, plus certain notes on the economic aspects, is set out in Enclos-
ures 1, 2, 3 and 4.
Progress in Canada
Recruitment. The opening of training facilities within the Royal
Canadian Air Force under the Empire Air Training Scheme (later
named the Commonwealth Air Training Plan).
Norwegian recruits continued to flock to the training centre in
Canada from all over the world. Even some Danes joined. The elemen-
tary training was followed up by practice on the available Curtiss, Dou-
glas and Northrop aircraft. Soon arrangements were made through the
RCAF to participate in the Empire Air Training Scheme, which then
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opened for Service Flying Training at Moose Jaw in Saskatchewan and
Medicine Hat in Alberta. Norwegian instructors were provided in both
places. The general Reconnaissance Course was made available for
pilots and navigators, as well as courses for other aircrew categories as
required.
Basic technical training was done by our self while specialist application
on type or function as required would follow in the UK. As a finish-
ing touch Norwegian pilots were given advanced flying training on the
Curtiss and Douglas before going overseas.
As the volume of flying training increased, it became practical to
move the camp to Muskota, about 100 miles north of Toronto. This
was in May 1943. Recruitment of volunteer Norwegians and basic air
force training continued here until the «Farewell to Canada» ceremony
took place on 16 February 1945. Training was then transferred to the
UK. The reason for the transfer was the cost of the establishment,
which on average had a strength of 700 persons; and latterly most of
the recruits were refugee Norwegians brought across to the UK from
Sweden. At that time facilities for training were made available at RAF
Station Winkleigh in North Devon.
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330 (N) Squadron at Akureyri
‘B’- flight located at Akureyri to
the north in Iceland.
330 (N) Squadron at Budareyri
‘C’- flight located at Budareyri to
the east in Iceland.
‘A’- flight and Sqn HQ located
in Fossvogur near Reykjavik in
Iceland. The squadron stayed there
from April 1941 until January 1943,
operating Northrop and (from summer
1942) Catalina aircraft.
330 (N) Squadron at Sullom Voe
330 (N) Sqn moved to Sullom Voe
in Shetland in July 1943 and stayed
there for the remainder of WWII.
330 (N) Squadron at Oban
330 (N) Sqn moved to Oban in
Scotland in January 1943 and
stayed there until July 1943.
By summer 1943, the Squadron
was operating Sunderland aircraft.











Figure 3: Map – 330 (Norwegian) Squadron, Coastal Command
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The stage is set.
Because of the occupation of Norway, the strategic importance of the
Northern waters and regions to the Battle of the Atlantic was highly
accentuated. Even before North Norway fell, British forces had occu-
pied Iceland and placed army and air forces there for its protection and
to carry out sea and air operations.
The last six months of 1940 had seen very large losses inflicted by
the German submarines on merchant shipping and the threat seemed
ever increasing. In addition the cruiser «Scheer» was active, shortly
after followed by the «Hipper». Soon the battleships «Scharnhorst»
and «Gneisenau» were expected to play their part.
In late 1940 discussions between the Commander of the joint Nor-
wegian Air Forces HQ in London and the Air Ministry highlighted
the value of using our 18 available Northrop seaplanes in support of
the Costal Command activities in Icelandic waters. The tasks would
be maritime reconnaissance, control and search, anti-submarine oper-
ation, convoy escort, transport and any other defence support needed
for Iceland proper that might arise.
The Northrop was a patrol aircraft on floats, single engine, speed
160 mph with endurance up to 7 hours. It had 4 wing-mounted
machineguns and 2 free, one for the navigator and one for the telegra-
phist. It could carry 3 depth charges weighing up to a total of 1,200
pounds.
The first contingent of the squadron arrived in Iceland from the
UK on 12 April 1941, followed some months later by personnel from
«Little Norway». This brought the strength to about 200. At that time
the aircraft were transported by ship and, although 41 ships were sunk
in the Atlantic that month, they all arrived safely. The formidable task
of assembling the aircraft from crates and bringing them into use must
be recorded. On 23 June 1941, 330 became the first operational Nor-
wegian squadron established outside the country. It also became the
largest of the Allied air units stationed in Iceland.
As only one airfield existed on the island (by Reykjavik), it was found
opportune to have the seaplane squadron split into three parts: «A»
flight to remain in Fossvagur near Reykjavik, which was also the site
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of the squadron HQ; «B» flight to be located at Akureyri to the north,
and «C» flight at Budareyri on the east coast. «C» flight in particular
suffered from extreme weather conditions as well as the difficulties of
the surrounding steep and mountainous terrain.
From the beginning 330 (N) sqdn concentrated primarily on the Battle
of the Atlantic. After the Soviet Union had come into the war in July
1941, the defence of convoys to and from Murmansk made Iceland
even more important. «B» and «C» flights were well situated to combat
German air reconnaissance that would alert their submarines, and to do
extensive escort duties. «A» and «B» flights could cover the Denmark
Strait in particular for the same purpose and were also able to attack
surface ships and submarines heading for the Atlantic. By the end of
1941, 330 Squadron numbered a total of 309 persons, 25 of whom were
British who were in the main to cater for communications and intelli-
gence.
The Northrop aircraft stood up remarkably well under the most
severe conditions of Icelandic climate and winter darkness, though it
soon became evident from the tasks allotted that longer range and bet-
ter armoury were required, and that two engines, de-icing equipment
and better navigation facilities would be most desirable. Therefore in
June 1942 Coastal Command provided two Consolidated Catalina for
the squadron on loan, and by July-August a further three were added.
These were also required because by this time the Northrop strength
had been reduced by losses to 13. The personnel strength of the squad-
ron was adjusted accordingly.
In mid-1942, after about a year of operations the squadron on Ice-
land had accomplished about 7,500 flying hours, and conducted 246
submarine searches, 379 convoy escorts, 250 reconnaissance flights and
18 ambulance flights. 15 submarines were detected and forced to sub-
merge; 9 were attacked of which 7 sustained damages. 8 reconnaissance
aircraft were engaged and damaged. The squadron’s losses amounted
to 10 Northrops and 2 Catalinas, with altogether 21 aircrew personnel.
Not only were the aircrew’s operational tasks affected by the extreme
hazards of the weather. It also posed exceedingly harsh conditions for
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the aircraft servicing personnel, who to a large extent had to work
outside on small tenders day and night. In both respects the squadron
received full credit from the RAF.
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Above is the «Operational Record Book» for 330 (N) Squadron on 27. August 1941,
as an example of one of the key tasks for the squadron – A/S sweep. Since the text
is a bit blurred, the text is repeated below:
A/S-sweep.
Airborne 1010 – waterborne 1458. Commenced search 1051 through: N. 6300 W.
2130, N. 6010 W. 1305. At 1209 hrs. psn. N. 6133 W. 1715 sighted conning tower of
U/boat about ½ mile ahead and slightly to port of a/c, course approx. 120°T. – a/c
flying at 900’. A/c altered course to approx. 045°T. and dived to about 50’ attempt-
ing to release stick of 3 D/C [Depth Charges]. D/C did not release. S/M [sub-
marine] then completely submerged and a/c continued circling spot. 1232 started
square search. 1248 psn. N. 6330 – W. 1720 sighted S/M periscope 1/2 mile ahead
on course approx. 225°T. A/c then flying at 750’. A/c dived to 50’ and during dive
opened fire with 3 M/G. At 50’ released 3 D/C by emergency release. Periscope
not visible when D/C released. D/C fell 4-6 sec. after and about 60’ ahead of point
where periscope was last seen. Sea rough, no oil or air-bubbles seen. A/c continued
circling area and dropped search marker. Nothing further seen. A/c remained in
vicinity until 1330 hrs. and then set course for base.
Weather pan. N. 6130 W. 1720 at 1300 hrs.
Visibility: 20 miles.




Figure 4: ’Operations Record Book’, 330 (Norwegian) Squadron – A/S sweep,
27.08.1941
29 Royal Air Force, Detail of work carried out, 27.08.1941, 330 (Norwegian) Squadron, Op-
erations Record Book, August, p. 7.
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As the struggle for the Atlantic progressed, the USA had increasingly
extended its support with bases for escort groups and aircraft. Eventu-
ally this included Iceland. Thus the Coastal Command there was
relieved and at the end of 1942, it was decided that 330 Squadron should
move to Oban in Scotland. It would now come under 15 Group Com-
mand and be equipped with Sunderlands. This big 4-engined flying
boat fully equipped required a crew of 10. In January 1943 the squadron
departed from Iceland, leaving a contingent of Northrops for a time at
Budareyri to guard the east coast.
After intensive training the first operations from Oban were carried
out on 20 April, thus bringing the squadron back into the Battle of
the Atlantic, which was now at its peak. The squadron still supported
the anti-submarine operations generally. However, the distance to areas
further north was deemed too long and impractical. The stay at Oban
was therefore short and the next base was Sullom Voe in Shetland. By 14
July the whole squadron of 13 aircraft was in place and could start oper-
ations, now under 18 Group Command. It welcomed the opportunity
to operate towards and along the Norwegian coast. The extended range
of the Sunderlands allowed the Murmansk convoys to be escorted far
to the north and east in the Arctic Ocean. Such missions could be both
demanding and tedious, but they formed a critical part of the ships’
protection against submarine attacks.
The weather in Shetland could be as harsh as that experienced in
Iceland. Though better facilities existed in the harbour, «gale-crews»
often had to be kept on board the big flying boats to avoid disaster.
Results and losses
330 Squadron remained at Sullom Voe until the end of the war. With its
Sunderlands it accomplished over 12,000 flying hours, and conducted
655 submarine searches, over 50 convoy escorts and 22 different rescue
tasks. 15 submarines were seen, of which 2 were sunk and 4 damaged.
2 German aircraft were damaged. 4 of the squadron’s aircraft were lost
with a total of 46 persons. These figures are in addition to the Squa-
dron’s accomplishments in Iceland, described earlier. In total the squad-
ron lost 16 aircraft with 63 persons.
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The first N-3PB production airframe during test period at Lake Elisnore, California.
330 (N) Squadron was the first operational Norwegian squadron within the Royal Air
Force. It became operational on 23 June 1941 – equipped with 18 Northrop N-3PB
seaplanes.
Northrop N-3PB GS-V. The photograph is probably taken at Akureyri, Iceland
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In June 1942, Costal Command provided 330 (N) Squadron with two Consolidated
Catalina Mk.IIIa amphibians, and by July-August an additional three were added. By the
end of 1942, it was decided that 330 (N) Squadron should move to Oban in Scotland, and
would be equipped with Sunderland flying boats.
FP536 was the last of the 14 Catalina Mk.III that were used by the Royal Air Force,
and is probably the same aircraft that was named «Mjølner» when it arrived at 330
(N) Squadron. The picture is most likely taken at Leuchars in April 1942, before it was
transferred to Iceland.





























331 (N) Squadron at Skeabrae
331 (N) Sqn stayed at Skeabrae from
September 1941 until May 1942. 
331 (N) Squadron at Castletown
331 (N) Sqn stayed at Castletown from
August to September 1941.
331 (N) Squadron Detachments
While at Skeabrae, 331 (N) Sqn had
detachments at Sumburgh Head.
331 (N) Squadron Detachments
While at Skeabrae, 331 (N) Sqn had
detachments at Peterhead.
331 (N) Squadron Detachments
While at Skeabrae, 331 (N) Sqn had
detachments at Dyce.
332 (N) Squadron at West Hartle-
pool
332 (N) Sqn operated partly from
Catterick and partly from West Hartle-
pool before they were transferred to
RAF Station North Weald.
331 (N) and 332 (N) Squadrons at North
Weald
331 (N) Sqn was transferred to RAF Station
North Weald in May 1942. 332 (N) Sqn was
transferred to RAF Station North Weald in June
1942. The two Squadrons became ‘The
Norwegian Wing’. On 1 November 1943, the
Wing became the ‘132 (Norwegian) Air eld’.
They stayed at North Weald until 30-31 March
1944, when they were moved to Bognor as part
of the preparations for the Allied invasion.
331 (N) and 332 (N) Squadrons at
Catterick
331 (N) Sqn was established at RAF
Station Catterick on 21 July 1941, and
stayed there until August the same year.
332 (N) Sqn was established at RAF
Station Catterick in January 1942, and




















Figure 5: Map – 331 (N) and 332 (N) Squadrons, Fighter Command
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The birth of the 2 Norwegian Fighter Squadrons
By spring 1941 the training in Canada of pilots and ground crew had
reached the stage that a first fighter squadron could be transferred and
stationed in the United Kingdom. On 21 July 1941 331 Squadron was
established at RAF Station Catterick under 12 Group, Fighter Com-
mand.
In September of the same year another contingent of ground crew
was transferred, which together with pilots, some of whom had already
seen service in Fighter Command, made up the second squadron. This
became 332 (N) Squadron, established on 21 January 1942 also at Cat-
terick.
Before 332 arrived, 331 had been moved first to the northern base
of Castletown (North Scotland) and then to Skeabrae (Orkneys). On
4 May 1942 it was transferred south to RAF Station North Weald, by
Epping, under 11 Group of Fighter Command. On 19 June 332 fol-
lowed, and for the rest of the war the two Norwegian squadrons oper-
ated together.
331 Squadron in the North
331 (N) Squadron was equipped at the outset with Hawker Hurricane
Mark I and shortly after obtained Mark II B. It became operational
while at Castletown (North Scotland) on 10 September with the pri-
mary task of providing air defence for the naval base at Scapa Flow.
It also offered general convoy protection in adjacent coastal waters.
To accommodate this task better the squadron was soon moved to
Skeabrae – a «difficult» and harsh airfield where single engine oper-
ations were made more difficult by the darkness during winter and the
frequent strong winds and icing conditions. Clouds unfortunately often
let the enemy hide before intercepts could be accomplished. To improve
coverage the squadron used to hold detachments at Sumburgh Head
(Shetlands), Dyce and Peterhead (North Scotland).
In November 1941 Spitfire II A’s replaced the Hurricanes and, as the
serviceability of the squadron’s aircraft had proved to be high, these
were again changed for factory-new Spitfire VB’s with 20 mm can-
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nons. This was done before the squadron was ordered south to North
Weald.
332 Squadron in Yorkshire
332 (N) Squadron at Catterick began using Spitfire II and then, like
331, changed to Spitfire VB. The squadron did mostly convoy protec-
tion and occasional air defence interceptions, partly operating out of
West Hartlepool. Here the first success and the first loss were registered
before the squadron joined 331 at North Weald on 19 June.
Once the Battle of Britain August-October 1940 and the Blitz Sep-
tember 1940 – May 1941 were over, Fighter Command turned to
offensive strategy, in cooperation with Bomber Command which so far
had represented the offensive part of RAF operations. Soon the US 8
Air Force joined in with its day operations. Germany and the Luftwaffe
were not to be given peace at any time.
In general the task of the air offensive was to cause damage to the
German war potential; in particular to cause losses to the Luftwaffe and
tie up its forces in Western Europe thus relieving the Eastern Front
now that Germany had attacked USSR. Simultaneously it was to cause
damage to the industries of France, Belgium and Holland that worked
for Germany and to the communications in these countries that sup-
ported the German war effort.
These Allied offensive operations were considered a most welcome
and important encouragement to the people of Britain after the ordeals
of the German attacks.
Bombers attacking targets on the Continent and Germany proper
needed protection. An invasion of the Continent would require theatre
air superiority.
The Norwegian Wing in Fighter Command.
In the following section the two squadrons – the «Norwegian Wing»
or just «The Norwegians» as they were often called within the Royal
Air Force – are dealt with as an entity.
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Statistics pertaining to the Norwegian Wing in 11 Group are satisfy-
ing. From a total of 69 fighter squadrons in South England at the time
they show:
– The best record of serviceable aircraft
– The highest number of flying hours, both in operations and train-
ing
– The lowest number of accidents per month and pr flying hour.
In addition, soon after their arrival, the Norwegians were placed best
or among the best in numbers of German aircraft shot down and dam-
aged per month.30
The RAF expressed its recognition by placing the squadrons among
the first to receive upgraded aircraft and equipment as such became
available, for example the fitting of giro gun sights.
Naturally the success of the squadrons was given due recognition
by the Norwegian military and political authorities in London. But it
was also recognised that the present operations, apart from air defence,
standing patrols and convoy protection i.e. all the offensive tasks, did
not conform to the Governmental Agreement of 28 May 1941, referred
to earlier.
This divergency in employment became all the more evident when
the RAF urged that the fighter squadrons be included in the Tactical
Air Force, which was in preparation prior to the invasion of the Con-
tinent (Operation Overlord). The Tactical Air Force was to comprise
the major part of Fighter Command squadrons together with squadrons
30 For instance, when summing up 1943, 331 Squadron was placed at the top of the list
among the 69 squadrons within 11 Group, Fighter Command when it came to approved
`claims’, with their 68 downed enemy aircraft, 15 probably downed, and 42 damaged.
They were also at the top when the fewest own losses in relation to number of downed
enemy aircraft were counted. 332 Squadron was listed sixth, with their 36 downed enemy
aircraft, 10 ½ probably downed, and 33 damaged. Vera Henriksen (1996) The History of
the Royal Norwegian Air Force. Volume 2. Five Years Abroad (June 1940 – May 1945), Oslo:
H. Ascehoug & Co (W. Nygaard) (In Norwegian: Luftforsvarets Historie. Bind 2. Fem år i
utlegd (juni 1940 – mai 1945), p. 248.
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from No. 2 Group of Bomber Command. The Norwegian Wing would
form part of 84 Group linked to the 1st Canadian Army.
At this time the Norwegian Air Forces HQ was preparing for a third
fighter squadron to be part of the existing wing. This must be judged
in the context of the central Norwegian joint defence planning. The
Government had ambitions of establishing forces that could join with
forces being raised in Sweden. It was hoped that these would unite
with the resistance groups in Norway and form a national contingent
to liberate the country. This force would require air elements. In this
respect the British authorities gave very little hope that any outside
forces might be diverted from the main Allied task that lay ahead. On
the Norwegian side the hope was nourished that the Fighter Wing of
three squadrons could be equipped with Mustangs, which had a greater
range than Spitfires and could be deployed from a base in Scotland.
Although the above is known, it has not been possible to document
the discussions that must have taken place between the Norwegian
Defence Staff, the Norwegian Air Forces HQ and the Air Ministry
on this issue; an issue which must be considered rather unrealistic in
view of the urgent priority for long-range escorts for the day bom-
bers over Germany. There has been recorded, however, in regard to
the Norwegian Wing in the Tactical Air Force, a calculation made by
the Air Ministry that pilot losses in the invasion and the months ahead
would considerably exceed those experienced so far. The approximately
750 ground crew would likewise be exposed. This led to an alterna-
tive proposal by Norway that the third squadron, in accordance with
the Government’s Agreement, be established as part of the air defence
forces in the UK. In the end the Air Ministry proposal for the Nor-
wegian Wing prevailed, apparently accepted without any expressions to
the contrary except that the question of a third Fighter Squadron was
deferred.
The Norwegian concurrence must be deemed pragmatic as well as
tolerant, though hardly popular in all of the national policy-making
circles. It departed from the original Government Agreement yet there
no longer existed a threat towards Britain. It is of interest to note that
the name of Norway in regard to «Overlord» is not to be found. The
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Wing received the decision to be part of the Tactical Air Force enthusi-
astically while regretting that an additional squadron was not formed.31
One effect of the curtailed build-up was a gradual surplus of new
pilots who were frustrated by being kept out of action. Eventually they
were assigned to the Wing from where to some extent seasoned pilots
were made available for other RAF squadrons.
Operations on the Continent.
In preparation for the invasion the Tactical Wing, called in the begin-
ning No. 132 (N) Airfield, was established on 1 November 1943. It
formed an independent fully mobile unit, containing all the elements
necessary to serve the deployed squadrons. In March 1944 it was enlar-
ged by the addition of RAF 66 Squadron, which was supported mainly
by Norwegian servicing crews. Some British Signal and Intelligence
elements were also added. 132 (N) Airfield thus comprised about 70 per
cent Norwegian and 30 per cent British personnel, and a joint command
structure was established. Before the invasion two RAF Regiment squa-
drons were attached for the purpose of local air and ground defence.
The Airfield was made mobile with some 280 vehicles of different kinds
used for salvage, servicing, flying control, medical and cookhouse facili-
ties etc.
In July 1944 an additional RAF Squadron, No. 127, joined the 132 (N)
Airfield, now termed 132 (N) Wing. The events and the variety of op-
erations of the campaign into Europe are beyond this paper. The route
began at Funtington (UK), crossed the Channel to the first airfield B
16 north of Caen on 20 August, then to B 33 Campneusville, B 57 Lille,
B 60 Grimbergen (near Bruxelles), B 79 Woensdrecht (in Holland)
where the Dutch squadron 322 joined the Wing, B 85 Schijndel near
31 The question of the third Norwegian squadron was reopened in the autumn of 1944, but
due to the progress of the war it did not materialize (this is the only footnote provided by
Wilhelm Mohr. All other footnotes in this book have been inserted by the author).
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S’Hertogenbosch, and finally B 106 Twente in North-East Holland.
The last day of operations was 21 April 1945. The two squadrons were
then withdrawn from 2 ATAF, and leaving all equipment behind was
transferred to 11 Group Fighter Command in preparation for possible
deployment in Norway. On 4 may the Germans capitulated, but the
situation as regards Norway remained uncertain until 7 May. By then
the servicing of the Wing was on the move towards the UK where it
was re-equipped. 36 Spitfires crossed to Norway from Dyce on 22 May;
the ground personnel with their equipment followed by sea.
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Above is the «Operational Record Book» for 332 (N) Squadron on 6. June
1944 – «D-Day». Since the text is a bit blurred, the text is repeated below:
On this first invasion day of Europe 332 Squadron made 4 Patrol flights
over the channel and the battle fields of Northern France. At 0715 hours
the squadron took off on the first patrol flight, led by Major Christie.
They returned safely at 0920 hours. 2nd flight was led by major Christie
too. They took off at 1215 hours and returned at 1420 hours. On the
third flight Major Christie led, but due to trouble with the drop tank he
had to return after 15 min. and Capt. Ryg took over. They had taken off
at 1630 hours and landed at 1810 hours. The 4th flight was led by w/c
Berg. They took off at 2040 hours and returned at 2245. During these 4
patrols they met no enemy fighter opposition and almost no flak was ex-
perienced. Weather was 5-8/10ths cloud and visibility good. Landing bar-
ges and ships streaming to and from the French coast were clearly seen,
as well as the landing operations, which seemed not to encounter much
opposition. One destroyer, presumably American, was observed in sinking
condition while rescue work was going on.32
Figure 6: ’Operations Record Book’, 332 (N) Squadron – D-Day, 06.06.1944
32 Royal Air Force, Summary of events, 06.06.1944, 332 (N) Squadron, Operations Record
Book, June 1944, p. 1.
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Results and losses.
To sum up, 331 and 332 Squadrons of the Norwegian Wing within
Fighter Command and 2nd Tactical Air Force are credited by the RAF
with 180 ½ enemy aircraft destroyed, 25 ½ probably destroyed and
123 damaged. They are otherwise credited with 381 motor vehicles,
62 locomotives, 70 rail wagons, 13 tanks, 134 motorcycles, buses and
staff cars, 20 armoured cars, 96 armoured rail wagons, 132 horse-drawn
vehicles, 45 trailers, 5 tractors, 8 troop-transport vehicles, 6 petrol tank-
ers, 68 lorries, 21 barges, 10 other boats and 1 ammunition depot.
The losses in operations were 72 killed, 11 held as prisoners of war (1
repatriated). 2 were shot trying to escape – and as a point of interest 2
of the 3 from the Big Escape that succeeded were from the Norwegian
Wing.
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2nd Lt Jens Müller from 331 (N) Squadron next to Hawker Hurricane BD734/
FN-D «Odin» at Skeabrae on the Orkney Islands.
331 (N) Squadron was initially equipped with Hawker Hurricane Mk. I, and shortly after
obtained Mk.IIb. In November 1941 Spitfire Mk.IIa replaced the Hurricanes and, as the
serviceability of the Squadron’s aircraft had proved to be high, these were again replaced
with factory-new Spitfire Mk.Vb’s with 20 mm cannons. This was done before the Squadron
was posted south to North Weald.
331 (N) Squadron with Spitfire Mk.Vb photographed at Catterick during a stop over
underway to North Weald on 5 May 1942.
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On 16 August 1943 the Norwegian Fighter Squadrons shot down the 100th enemy aircraft.
The pilot was Captain Svein Heglund (331 (N) Squadron), who also was credited with the 99th
and 101st enemy aircraft. To commemorate the occasion, Captain Heglund was presented with
a pewter dish and a bottle of aquavit. Heglund had 16 confirmed kills, 5 probable kills and 6
damaged enemy aircraft in WWII – which put him on the top of the list of Norwegian fighter
pilots’ claims during WWII.
Pilots from 332 (N) Sqn checking a map in front of their Spitfire Mk.IXc aircraft. BS249/
AH-R can be clearly identified.
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333 (N) Squadron at Woodhaven
From February 1942, Norwegian
Catalinas operated as ‘Norwegian
Detachment Woodhaven’, as part
of RAF 210 Sqn. On 1 February 1943,
they became the 1447 (Norwegian)
Flight. On 10 May 1943, the unit at
Woodhaven became A- ight of 333
(Norwegian) Squadron. 
333 (N) Squadron at 18 Group at Banff
333 (N) Squadron’s B-flight was deployed
to Banff to assist the RAF strike force in
September 1944. They stayed there for the
remainder of World War II.
333 (N) Squadron at RAF
Station Leuchars
333 (N) Squadron’s B-flight was
established on 10 May 1943, oper-
















Figure 7: Map – 333 (N) Squadron, Coastal Command
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The Catalinas
In accordance with Norwegian ambitions a unit of seaplanes was
desired to operate along the coastlines and in the fiords, transport-
ing personnel, picking up saboteurs, doing reconnaissance, and making
attacks on shipping and submarines. The idea was supported by Coastal
Command, but was initially held back by the Air Ministry until 8 Febru-
ary 1942 when the «Norwegian Detachment» of RAF 210 Squadron
was based at Woodhaven by the Firth of Tay near Dundee. The element
operated Catalina flying boats. After a year of operations and in recog-
nition of its valuable special operations, the detachment was singled out
on 1 january 1943 as a separate 1477 (Norwegian) Flight. It consisted
of 3 Catalinas with Norwegian aircrew and servicing personnel.
The Mosquitos
Ever since autumn 1940 the Norwegian Air Forces HQ had pressed for
the capability to attack targets along the Norwegian coast and inside
Norway. The opportunity came when Costal Command supported the
use of Norwegian aircrew for such tasks. In April 1943 five Mosquitos
were made available on loan, plus additional aircraft for training pur-
poses. On the addition of another Mosquito, a separate flight was
formed alongside that of the Catalina flight.
By 10 may 1943 the two flights became the 333 (Norwegian) Squad-
ron, operationally under No. 18 Group of Costal Command. The Mos-
quito operating base was RAF Station Leuchars, while the Catalinas
remained at Woodhaven. The squadron strength was 30 officers, 70
quartermasters, and 150 rated personnel including 11 women.
Both flights were very active. The Catalinas provided a valuable
means of communications to and from Norway. They also carried
out anti-submarine operations, as did 330 and other Costal Command
squadrons, in the sea area between the Faeroe Islands and Iceland, cal-
led «Rosengarten» by the Germans. Because of the performance of the
Mosquitos and the use of surprise, various new tasks were made poss-
ible. It became evident, however, that the required training for conver-
sion to the Mosquito had been based rather too much on Norwegian
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impatience and overconfidence and British trust. Although there was
some initial success, undue losses caused Costal Command to enforce a
temporary non-operational status for intensive training purposes. The
results were encouraging and by mid-November 1943 the flight was
again made operational.
The time that followed was mainly devoted to reconnaissance along
the Norwegian coast, attacking German aircraft and ships, and search-
ing for submarines that to a large extent depended on the North Sea.
After the invasion on the Continent, some Costal Command aircraft
that had previously been employed in the Bay of Biscay and the English
Channel were transferred to 18 Group Banff and Gallachy for strike
operations against German ships along the Norwegian coast. The Nor-
wegian Mosquitos were then deployed to Banff to assist this RAF strike
force, either as «outriders» for target search and identification, or as a
guiding element for the strike itself. On such operations the crew’s in-
timate knowledge of geography and conditions proved to be most valu-
able.
In early 1945 the Air Ministry proposed that the two flights of the
squadron be formed as two independent squadrons, but this was not
carried out while the war was in progress.
333 squadron («A» and «B» flights) was credited by the RAF with 4
submarines sunk, 8 damaged, 18 German aircraft destroyed and 2 dam-
aged. It performed 22 special missions to Norway and North Russia.
28 members of the aircrew were lost, and 4 taken prisoner.
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Above is the «Operational Record Book» for 333 (N) Squadron on 12.
March 1945, as an example of one of the key tasks for the squadron – A/S
patrols. Since the text is a bit blurred, the text is repeated below:
44 Mosquitoes with 12 Mustangs S/C from Peterhead at 1318.
At 1415 in posn. 5725N 0410E 1 M/V in ballast bearing 360T. 6 miles
Ca. 330T painted white, believed to be neutral. At 1542 in posn. 5645N
1130E turned North, no sighting due to bad weather. At 1647 in posn.
5740N 0602E formation attacked by Me 109 [Messerchmitt Bf 109, also
called Me 109], up to 8 E/A seen. G/333 flying at 200 ft. saw Vic of 3
Me 109 which turned in to STB behind wing. G/333 followed in curve
of pursuit and attacked one of the Me’s firing two bursts from 150 to 75
yds scoring strikes and setting E/A on fire. E/A did tight turn and dived
towards sea and was last seen at 200 ft. still diving on N.course and emit-
ting much black smoke. At the end of combat G.F/333 turned back to es-
cort damaged Mustang but unable to contact due to bad vis. One Me 109
destroyed, no damage to A/C or crew.
Vis, very hazy, nil cloud, W/V nil, sea calm.33
Figure 8: ’Operations Record Book’, 333 (N) Squadron – A/S patrol in Skagerak,
12.03.1945
33 Royal Air Force, Detail of work carried out, 12.03.1945, 333 (N) Squadron, Flight Banff,
Operations Record Book, March 1945, p. 4.
65
Catalina Mk.I FP121/Z «Jøssing» from 333 (N) Sqn.
Since February 1942, Norwegian Catalinas operated as «Norwegian Detachment Woodhaven»,
as part of RAF 210 Sqn. On 1 February 1943, they became the 1447 (Norwegian) Flight. On
10 May 1943, the unit at Woodhaven became A-flight of 333 (Norwegian) Squadron. 333 (N)
Squadron’s B-flight was established on 10 May 1943, operating Mosquitos. They stayed there
until September 1944. 333 (N) Squadron’s B-flight was deployed to Banff to assist this RAF
strike force in September 1944. They stayed there for the rest of World War II.
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R(No)AF / 45 Group, Transport Command.
The RAF had established its ferry Command (later named Transport
Command) in July 1941 at Dorval Airport in Montreal, Canada. The
task was primarily to freight 2 and 4-engined aircraft from Canada/USA
to theatres of war on a worldwide basis.
In late 1941 four Norwegian pilots formed a unit that in time came
to number about 40 persons. The unit was termed «R(No)AF / 45
Group». Experienced pilots, navigators, wireless operators, mechanics,
instructors, meteorologists and air traffic controllers made up the per-
sonnel. Many pilots and aircrew members served in the unit during
periods of rest from other operational flying.
In the beginning of 1942 the aircraft commonly ferried were the
Hudson, Lodestar and Venturas. The usual route taken was Gander or
Goose Bay, Greenland, Iceland and Prestwick. Some B-24 Liberators
went by Gander and Prestwick to the Far East. B-25 Mitchells, A-20
Mosquito Mk.II, DZ700/H, 333 (N) Sqn. B-flight at Leuchars in the summer of 1943.
In the background two Beaufighter Mk.II aircraft can be seen. These Beaufighters were
used by the Squadron as trainers.
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Bostons and B-26 Marylands were added, also C-47 Dakotas, Catalina
PBYs, Lancasters, and Mosquitos.
Altogether 690 aircraft were delivered overseas that had either a Nor-
wegian crew or had individual Norwegian members as part of the crew.
The losses amounted to five persons.
Of the occupied countries only Poland was more strongly rep-
resented in Transport Command than Norway.
Norwegians serving in British units.
Bomber Command.
Aircrew members of the Norwegian Air Forces were admitted into
Bomber Command from October 1942. Throughout the war 60 Nor-
wegians flew on 4-engined aircraft («heavies»). Of these 22 became
Captains (skippers). The crew otherwise were generally a mixture of
British, Commonwealth and Norwegian personnel. 9 of the 22 skip-
pers completed the full «operational tour» of 30. Two made one tour
as navigators and then another tour as pilot/skippers. After the full tour
two became Flight Commanders (one on the Pathfinder Force). One
was skipper on the Mitchell 2-engine bomber of RAF 180 Squadron
(Two Group), and became Flight Commander.
Losses amounted to 13 of the skippers and 29 of the other crewmem-
bers. In addition five were taken prisoner of war.
Within the framework of Bomber Command, the «Special Duties»
consisted of two squadrons of RAF Bomber Command operating out of
Tempsford. The task was to serve the underground forces in occupied
countries either by airdropping personnel and supplies, or delivering
or picking up agents.
One Norwegian served as skipper and Flight Commander in 161
Squadron after a full tour in Bomber Command. Another, with a Nor-
wegian navigator, completed a tour on drop-service with Halifax, then
continued on delivery and pick-up service with Lysander, mainly into
France.
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Fighter Command.
Many Norwegian pilots and navigators served at various periods in dif-
ferent RAF Fighter Squadrons. Three of these were given the func-
tion of Wing leaders («Wingco/flying»). Four became Squadron Com-
manders and two Flight Commanders. In total Norwegians in British
squadrons of Fighter Command have been accredited with 58 aircraft
destroyed, 4 probably destroyed, 17 damaged plus a variety of ground
targets engaged.
In addition a number of Norwegian pilots in the course of service
with RAF in Fighter Command held temporary positions in gunnery
weapon training units and even duties in operational staff.
Notably the RAF No. 604 and the 85 Mosquito night fighter squa-
drons had attracted many Norwegian aircrew members. These squa-
drons were at first part of the air defence force of Southern England.
Prior to the invasion the squadrons were transferred to Bomber Com-
mand with the primary task of night intruder, to offer protection to the
bomber stream and to attack selected targets in Germany or enemy-
held territory. Altogether fifteen Norwegian aircrew members followed
85 squadron. As a small intermezzo the squadron was brought back
into Fighter Command; Norwegian aircrews accounted for eleven fly-
ing bombs.
The «Stockholm Element».
This contingent was a separate Norwegian war effort in an area of
prime national interest. It is recorded in this report although, while
assistance was rendered by operational control, it was not subordinated
to any of the RAF Commands.
Air transport was required between the UK and Sweden because of
the great number of refugees. By January 1941 2,851 such refugees were
registered. After Germany attacked Russia, this avenue of escape was
no longer available. At the same time the demands on the Norwegian
forces in the UK were ever increasing.
After some endeavours to establish a separate arrangement, an agree-
ment was reached by which BOAC allowed two Norwegian aircraft and
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crew to operate within its route concession between Stockholm and
Leuchars. The arrangement began in the summer of 1941 although
the final Anglo-Norwegian Governmental Agreement was first reached
in midsummer 1942. Formally the Norwegian aircraft «belonged» to
BOAC and carried BOAC registration. The crew in BOAC uniform
were paid by the company on a refund basis and carried British pas-
sports.
The Norwegian contingent was strengthened by 4 Lockheed Lodes-
tars provided by the Norwegian government. Then 3 BOAC Lockheed
Hudsons were added. However, as German defence became increas-
ingly alerted to the activity and more effective, the Air Ministry in the
spring of 1943 restricted the traffic to couriers for essential missions,
using Mosquitos only. The passenger figures from Stockholm to Scot-
land by that time were in 1941 – 141; in 1942 – 559; in 1943 – 533.
The Norwegian authorities found, however, that transport flights for
recruitment purposes were of such importance that another arrange-
ment was essential. This was felt particularly by the Air Force, which
had already made arrangements to select candidates for pilot training
from refugees in Stockholm. In October 1943 an arrangement was es-
tablished by which Norway would, independently but still within the
BOAC structure, maintain the route to Stockholm using the Lockheed
Lodestars. The British still provided airport and operating services out
of Leuchars.
This proved to be an effective arrangement and the traffic increased
considerably. The number of passengers between Stockholm and Scot-
land is registered as 962 in 1944, and 1,114 until 7 May 1945. In the last
year of the war the Norwegian Air Force acquired under lend-lease 10
Douglas C 47 Dakotas, but these were just introduced when hostilities
ceased. During the war 3,309 passengers were transported to the UK
using the Stockholm route. The losses amounted to 11 aircrew and 18
passengers.
It is of interest to note that the Norwegian urge for transport for
recruitment purposes, strongly supported by the British Foreign Sec-
retary Mr Anthony Eden, led to an American offer of assistance. This
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operation using 4-engined Liberators transported 1,576 persons who
had already been earmarked in Sweden for service in the Norwegian
forces in the UK.
Closing Remarks
A summary of this paper is set out in the opening paragraphs.
Operational command by the RAF provided an effective and har-
monious structure in which Norwegian fighting units and individuals
could fulfil their aspirations, together with members of other Allied
forces. It was marked by a friendly spirit, fairness and recognition of
merit, appreciated by flying and ground crew alike. In the higher eche-
lons of control – Norwegian Air Forces HQ in London and the Air
Ministry – relations were sometimes more difficult, because political
considerations, joint military planning and economic questions could
complicate the use of Norwegian forces within the overall Allied war
aims. Frank and open discussions, helped in my view by the generous
attitude of the RAF, maintained a constructive atmosphere for solving
any problems that arose. In this the traditionally close ties between our
two countries may have played their part, as certainly did the perform-
ance of our fighting elements.
In a message to the Norwegian Air Force at the end of the war the RAF
Air Council finished
… when your aircrews return to their own land, they will carry with them the
good wishes and warm friendship of the Royal Air Force who earnestly hope
that the links which have bound our two air forces in adversity and war will
be maintained and developed in peace.
It is noted that it was not only the common cause and the sharing that
had cemented our air forces. For the Norwegians in exile the RAF
stations became their true home. This again led many close and lasting
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links to be forged between the local population and our personnel of
all categories and ranks.
A sign of the relationship from our side may be judged by the large
volume of membership of all branches held by the Norwegian branch
of the Royal Air Force Association.
The Royal Norwegian Air Force in its post war structure owes a great
deal to the example and traditions demonstrated by the Royal Air Force
during the war.
Enclosure 1
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND THE ROYAL NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT
CONCERNING THE ORGANISATION AND EMPLOYMENT
OF THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM.
The Government of Norway and the Government of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Affirming their determination to prosecute the war to a successful
conclusion,
Agreeing that one of the objects of the war is the re-establishment of
the freedom and independence of Norway through its complete liber-
ation from German domination,
Recognising the importance in their common interest of maintaining
the armed forces of Norway, and
Desiring to establish the principles on which those forces will be
organised for co-operation with the Allied Armed Forces,
have agreed as follows:
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Article 1.
The Norwegian Armed Forces in the United Kingdom (comprising
Land, Sea and Air Forces) shall be employed either for the defence of
the United Kingdom or for the purpose of regaining Norway. They
shall be organised and employed under British command, in its charac-
ter as the Allied High Command, as the Armed Forces of the Kingdom
of Norway allied with the United Kingdom.
Article 2 concerns Land Forces.
Article 3 concerns the Norwegian Navy.
Article 4.
Units of the Norwegian Air Forces shall be organised to operate with
the British Air Force as provided in Appendix III of the present Agree-
ment.
Article 5.
Jurisdiction over the personnel of the Norwegian Armed Forces shall
be exercised in accordance with the provisions of Appendix IV of the
present Agreement.
Article 6.
(1) The Norwegian Armed Forces shall be equipped, paid and main-
tained at the expense of the Norwegian Government.
(2) Subject to any specific condition to the contrary in the Appendices
of the Present Agreement, any costs incurred by the British author-
ities in connection with the application of the present Agreement
shall on demand be reimbursed by the Norwegian Government to
the Government of the United Kingdom.
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In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized for this purpose
by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement
and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done in duplicate in London the 28th day of May, 1941, in the English
language. A Norwegian text shall subsequently be agreed upon between






RELATING TO THE NORWEGIAN AIR FORCES
Article 1.
Certain units of the Norwegian Air Forces shall be attached to the
British Air Force and shall act under the operational control of the
British Air Force authorities.
Article 2.
These units of the Norwegian Air Forces shall operate under the Nor-
wegian flag and shall be manned by Norwegian personnel. The Nor-
wegian authorities shall be responsible for maintaining and replacing
the personnel of these units, as necessary. The British authorities shall
render all possible assistance in the mobilisation and training of the
personnel of the Norwegian Air Forces.
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Article 3.
(1) The internal administration of all Norwegian air units and their
personnel shall remain the responsibility of the Norwegian
authorities, but units attached to the British Air Force and placed
under the operational control of the British Air Force authorities
shall act under the orders of the British Commanders of the for-
mation to which they are attached.
(2) The detailed conditions of service of Norwegian Air personnel
employed with the British Air Force shall be arranged by direct
discussion between the appropriate Norwegian authorities and the
British Air Ministry.
Article 4.
At the request of the Norwegian authorities or the commanders of
Norwegian air-units, the British Air Force authorities shall make all
necessary arrangements for the supply and maintenance of these units




OVER MEMBERS OF THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES
Article 1.
Subject to the provisions of Articles 2, 3 and 4 below, jurisdiction in
matters of discipline and internal administration over members of the
Norwegian Land, Sea and Air Forces in the United Kingdom shall
be exercised in accordance with Norwegian military law, and offences
against discipline shall be tried and punished accordingly by the Nor-
wegian Service courts and authorities.
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Article 2.
Personnel of the Norwegian Air Forces serving with the British Air
Force, whether in Norwegian units or individually, shall be subject to
British Air Force discipline and British Air Force law as if they were
commissioned or enlisted in the British Air Force, so long as they are
serving with a unit of the British Air Force or with a unit of the Nor-
wegian Air Force stationed at a British Air Force Station. They shall
also be subject to the approved military law for the Norwegian forces,
when not serving with a unit of the British Air Force or at a British
Air Force Station. Where an Air Force court is constituted for the trial
of an officer or airman of the Norwegian Air Forces serving with the
British Air Force for an offence against British Air Force law, it shall
consist of an equal number of British and Norwegian officers, with, in
addition, a British officer as President of the Court.
Article 3.
The offences of murder, manslaughter and rape shall be tried only by
the Civil Courts of the United Kingdom.
Article 4.
Acts or omissions constituting offences against the law of the United
Kingdom other than murder, manslaughter and rape will be liable to
be tried by the Civil Courts of the United Kingdom.
Article 5.
In the case of any offence coming under Articles 3 or 4 above, the facts
shall be reported without delay, in accordance with arrangements to be
made between the Norwegian and British Authorities, by the respon-
sible Authorities of the Norwegian Force concerned to the appropriate
authority in the United Kingdom unless the offender is already in the
custody of the civil authorities.
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Article 6.
Where a member of the Norwegian Armed Forces is to be tried by a
Civil Court of the United Kingdom, the responsible authority of the
Norwegian Force concerned shall give such facilities to the appropri-
ate civil authorities in the United Kingdom as may be necessary for the
purpose of providing for the trial.
Article 7.
When members of the Norwegian Land, Sea and Air Forces are serv-
ing in any territory outside the United Kingdom which is under the
authority of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom the ex-
pression «United Kingdom» shall, in relation to those members, mean
that territory.
Article 8.
Any offence or act of omission committed by any member of the Nor-
wegian Armed Forces on board a warship flying the Norwegian Flag is
excluded from the scope of Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the present Appen-
dix.
Enclosure 4
NOTE ON THE ECONOMIC AGREEMENT
The economic agreement made as a result of the main agreement
stated among other things that the Norwegian squadrons furnished
with British equipment became Norwegian property. These were paid
outright £180,000 per squadron. The sum included aircraft, unit equip-
ment and other special equipment required.
Norway further paid an annual fee of £520,000 per squadron, later
reduced to £420,000 per squadron, towards the obligation of the United
Kingdom to hold the Norwegian squadrons in first-class condition at
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all times. This included the replacement of lost aircraft, repairs to dam-
aged aircraft and other squadron material, spare parts, service and main-
tenance of aircraft, transport, billeting and messing of personnel, fuel,
weapons, ammunition etc. plus training of air and ground personnel as
required.
The expenses for the 132. (N) Wing were covered by British authori-
ties.
All salaries to personnel were paid by Norway in accordance with the
national scale.
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PART II
The Ground Crews’ Participation




The Air Force’s participation in the fighting on the Continent 1944/45
132 (N) Wing consisting of fighter Squadrons 331 (N) and 332 (N),
had found its place and rhythm at the North Weald airbase just north-
east of London. This base had become a home for the personnel, and
they thrived there. Within the British Air Force [RAF] and the Figh-
ter Command to whom they belonged for their operational efforts,
the squadrons were renowned for the professional standards of their
technical personnel, and their ability to adjust and show initiative. The
Norwegian authorities therefore considered it an honour when the
British Air Force [RAF] wanted the Norwegian squadrons as partici-
pants during the invasion. However, there were a number of issues to
take into consideration, partly due to the established military agree-
ment with regard to Norwegian military efforts outside Norway. In
Article One of the Agreement, it is stated: ’The Norwegian forces …
shall be used either to defend the United Kingdom or to re-conquer
Norway’. Another consideration was of a somewhat more practical and
pressing nature. In order to maintain the squadrons’ fighting ability
as far as pilots were concerned, there was the question of whether the
Norwegians would be able to replace their personnel in accordance
with what allied calculations deemed necessary. For pilots, the British
Air Force [RAF] anticipated significantly higher losses than operations
thus far had caused. Yet also with regard to the ground crews, losses
had to be faced, and due to the insecurity of war such losses might have
resulted in a sudden and drastic reduction of the force. For this reason,
it was decided to drop the planned third Norwegian fighter squadron.
This was unfortunate, but the Government’s decision to allow the Nor-
wegian Wing to participate in the invasion was met with enthusiasm
and anticipation by the personnel.
For the two Squadrons, still at North Weald, it became a very busy
period. The air operations continued and amounted primarily to par-
ticipation in the collective air offensive aimed at destroying the Ger-
man Air Force [Luftwaffe]. However, at the same time, the Squadrons
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were to go through organizational and structural changes. Mobility
and flexibility were the keywords. A tactical Wing HQ was established
at the same time as the Squadrons were made smaller and stream-
lined for full mobility through air lines of communications. Ground
personnel were separated and technical maintenance was centralized
under the Wing, even though some elements were kept by the original
Squadrons. Even so, the technical section was to continue to support
any flying operation where circumstances required the use of the air-
field.
The Norwegian personnel of various professions and disciplines
numbered approximately 500 at this point in time. Yet one more British
fighter squadron, No. 66, was attached to the Wing. A ground element
for this squadron was built up mainly of Norwegian personnel, and
this was to be a part of the Wing’s centralized maintenance system. In
addition, the British provided two special mobile communication units
to maintain lines of communication within the Allied system, provide
cipher services, and so forth. In the same manner, the British Air Force
provided two squadrons for the low defence [Base Defence] of the air-
field.
The whole Wing was to be made mobile. All workshops, control
units, kitchens, mess halls, field hospitals, etc., had to be able to be
moved by trucks or special vehicles, of which petrol-, fire- and crane
trucks used to remove wreckage from the runway were among the hea-
viest. A huge programme to teach the personnel to drive and operate
in convoys was established. The various types of cars were far from the
easiest to handle. After a while, the Wing received 350 cars.
Quartering was to be in tents. A minimum of field equipment, such
as simple woollen blankets, was distributed to each person. Atten-
tion was focused on how to operate under the field conditions, setting
up camp, hygiene arrangements, physical adjustment, and also disci-
pline, such as shooting exercises, the handling of mines, camouflage
routines, training in self-defence, and fieldwork, in order to improve
one’s own level of protection. Hazardous working conditions would
have been an inevitable result of a flight line under these circum-
stances.
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Flying operations continued undiminished. In addition, the tasks and
targets caused increased damage to the aircraft, for instance as a result of
the low flying attacks on the German V-1 launchers along the Channel
coastline, heavily defended as it was by anti-aircraft artillery. For the
technical personnel, this represented a challenge that by far exceeded
any shift arrangement.
The Wing left North Weald on 31 March 1944. The original Squa-
drons were flown to the landing strip at Bognor on the south coast. The
remainder of the Wing’s personnel travelled via country roads, divided
into two groups, one front echelon that left in advance in order to
receive the aircraft, and one rear echelon to enable the aircraft to leave.
The personnel travelled separately by car together with their own crew
and equipment, with various special vehicles tucked into the convoy
where they were needed.
Clearly, the invasion was approaching. For the squadrons, the pri-
mary task was to ensure air superiority in the invasion phase. Still,
the air defence tasks were not to be forgotten, as it was of paramount
importance that the enormous force projection on the south coast was
not discovered. Accordingly, it was necessary to operate under field
conditions at an enormous tempo. No one was permitted to take leave
any more.
Equipment and personnel were undoubtedly up to the task, but even
so continued adjustments and training were important. Initiative and
inventiveness proved to be of the utmost significance, and this was
true from the top leadership down to each man. Subsequently, confir-
mation was received of the solid underlying recruitment basis that the
Air Force had been fortunate enough to establish from the very begin-
ning, incorporating whalers and mature, experienced sailors. This had
been proved previously during the establishment of units in Canada,
Iceland, the Shetlands, Woodhaven, and the fighter squadrons, and stif-
fened morale when insecurity and tension increased.
The invasion started whilst the Norwegian Wing was at Bognor. The
thunder from transport aircraft with paratroopers and gliders dragging
behind could be heard throughout the night of 5 June. It was like a car-
pet of aircraft, but still the silhouettes of single aircraft could be seen
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against the clear night sky. In this serious situation the Wing waited to
be transferred while a landing strip was being prepared. At a ceremony
the next morning, no field priest could have experienced more attentive
Norwegians.
The strain thus far had been significant work pressure, often with lack
of sufficient sleep. There were sporadic German attacks here and there,
but the Wing’s airfield had not yet come under attack. The increased
tension could probably best be recognized by increased concentration
and silence, even among those who normally were outspoken and lively.
This was mixed with anticipation and the inspiration of being allowed
to participate in the forthcoming events.
Even from the initial phase of the invasion, the Norwegian aircraft
stretched their area of operations deep into northern France, although
the ground crews could not be transferred to the Continent until 16
August. Then, vehicles and equipment were phased through the gath-
ering area, shipped in on amphibious ships and transferred over the
Channel. Before the transfer, the Wing had moved several times, from
Bognor to Tangmere and then from there to Funtington, all in southern
England. These movements naturally represented a burden in them-
selves, but at the same time they represented something close to a drill.
During the movements the squadrons needed both to operate con-
stantly and be ensured of the necessary technical support.
The transfer to the Continent was delayed due to German resistance
at the city of Caen. This was because the Wing’s allocated airstrip B16
lay just north of the city. Finally the ground crews were underway, and
the journey itself provided the personnel with a much-needed breath-
ing space, although it was not without drama, as mines were still a real
threat. This may have been witnessed with their own eyes as a large
cargo vessel went down in the immediate vicinity of the troops. Uncer-
tainty of a different nature related to their final destination. Caen had
been taken on 9 July after 450 heavy bombers had been put to work,
but the German 21st Panzer Division and parts of the 12th SS Panzer
still represented a threat. We knew that the Canadian forces were still
consolidating in the area. The Wing needed to be prepared for self-
defence and base defence.
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For those who have not experienced driving off landing vessels
and a ’beach commander’s’ unchallenged authority in assembling and
redirecting vehicles, the situation is hard to explain. The activity on the
beaches, as well as on the big harbour bridges (Mulberry Harbours),
was still so intense that capacity was exploited to breaking point. The
’slogan’ was ’get out of the way, but stay on the route and roads, because
mine-clearing stops on the side of the road’. Along the route were infi-
nite numbers of various forms of transport and supplies, and after a
while there was increased movement of units that manoeuvred towards
the combat area.
The ground crews established themselves on airstrip B16 on 22
August, at the same time as the engineer troops finished the runway and
evacuation flights with the wounded left for England. There was still
sporadic shooting in the area, but units were clearing the area and life
was beginning to return to normal in two nearby villages. The Wing
prepared to receive the squadrons, and operations continued after their
arrival.
It is rather strange to think of how quickly operations restarted, de-
spite all the movement that still had to be done on roads with white
markings. Cleared areas were marked in the same way, and ground
crews had to make their own foxholes. The Wing had been repaid for its
preparations and training. The system worked, and there was no doubt
that the morale and spirit were solid and uplifting factors for each man,
even though the various enterprises were spread and the tasks were dif-
ferent and many-faceted.
Still, it was not the actions of war alone that marked the Wing’s stay
at B16. In his book Spitfire, General Helge Mehre writes:
The weather changed from burning heat to rain and fog, runway conditions just
as fast from intense dust to slippery mud. If an aircraft ended up outside its tracks,
it was inevitably stuck. The dust problem was so interfering that one had to put on
’desert filters’ on the engines’ air inlets, like they used in North Africa. Cars with-
out four-wheel-drive were useless outside asphalt or ’tracked roads’. When possible,
the tent quarters were placed in woods and [on] high ground. In the mess tents one
had to lay wooden boards and rough sacking as flooring. The tables were covered
85
PART II – The Ground Crews’ Participation in the War on the Continent 1944/45
with sheets, and as well as conditions allowed, all food had to be covered due to
enormous swarms of flies. There was a dreadful stench from poorly-buried corpses
without grave crosses or other markings (fallen Germans, while the Canadians
and Polish had taken care of their own) in several places within the camp area.
It was not allowed to drink un-boiled water. The apple trees were full of 334
ripe fruit, sour cider-apples, destined for apple lemonade and calvados. But many
’had’ to taste it. A dysentery-like disease went like an epidemic through the entire
bridgehead, and created unbelievable discomfort for each personnel and tragicomic
situations for many who did not make it to a certain place.
General Mehre’s sobriety should be well-known.
The Norwegian 132 (N) Wing’s further journey passed through north-
ern France, through Lille to Brussels in Belgium, on to Antwerp in
the Dutch province of Holland, along the Maas’ southern shores, over
Eindhoven and a piece of German territory at Emmerick, until it
reached its final destination of Enschede. The corresponding airfields
and names included B33 Campneusville (Lissieux), B39 St. Druer and
thereafter B57 Lille, and B60 Grimbergen outside Brussels (see Fig-
ure 9). Although it was only one month since the Wing had left B16,
the advances had gone quickly as the personnel had become very pro-
fessional.
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Figure 9: Map – 132 (N) Wing on the Continent 1944–4534
34 In the original text (p. 32), Lieutenant General Wilhelm Mohr used a map taken from
Major General Helge Mehre’s book Spitfire. The map presented here has been prepared
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After the Allied breakthrough in Normandy, the German divisions were
beaten towards an unorganized escape through the Falaise-Argentan
area. The aircraft relentlessly hunted for vehicles and attacked any
movement, bombed bridges and concentrations of forces. It became a
complete rout with enormous losses of life, equipment and prisoners.
The pilots reported being able to smell the battlefield at an altitude of
several thousand feet. However, there were still groups that had man-
aged to escape, and who might have been desperate, ambitious, or had
Germany as their goal. In addition, there were still panzer elements that
could not be accounted for.
However, the advance could not wait, and the Wing with its front-
and rear echelons had to proceed accordingly. In that way protection
became somewhat more or less a matter of chance, even though the
convoys in themselves offered a sense of security. Also, there were other
movements underway and various strong points had been established,
although not everyone could benefit from these. It was only natural that
the units had to be split up, because certain damaged aircraft needed
to be left behind. The various ground crews had to wait until they
were ready, and then they had to drive and navigate along partly dam-
aged roads, towards what would hopefully be the next airstrip. Taking
a wrong turn into the desolate French landscape was part of the job.
During night-time, when lights were off, one had to hide with one’s
weapons at the ready. At the same time there was a lot of other activity,
and under such conditions sounds and movement from one’s own forces
could be just as frightening as those made by the enemy. Despite the
circumstances, all of the ground crews came through because they had
wanted to come through.
The food could be encountered as unpleasant after a while, especially
regarding bully beef, biscuits and tea. While bully beef [corned beef] is
undoubtedly nutritious, it had its own way of ending up in a thick masse,
despite the well-intentioned cooks’ best efforts at introducing variety.
The biscuits, which were hard, regularly ended up as some sort of mix-
ture in the tea, and hence problems with teeth and sore gums were not
uncommon. In time, given that fresh water and milk were non-existent,
a bowl of soup was really the only thing one could look forward to.
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After their experiences at B16, the personnel were apprehensive about
eating fruit and vegetables.
After B57 at Lille, the situation improved significantly. The city itself
and the opportunity to meet its population were a source of encour-
agement. The diet became more varied, even though the basis for it
remained. Everything influenced vitality and mood. At B60, which was
located at Grimbergen close to Brussels, the situation was the same, but
by then October had arrived with autumn rain and increasing cold.
I doubt that there was anyone who could match the Norwegian
ground crews in terms of initiative and inventiveness to improve the
situation. The eight-man tents came without flooring, leaks were inevi-
table, and mud from outside soon became part of the mattresses. B60
Grimbergen was a mud pit, and laundry, drying and personal hygiene
became a problem of significant dimensions. Despite this, the strangest
washing arrangements were invented, some even with ingenious mech-
anisms for heating. After a while the tents were furnished with various
formwork, such as wooden boards for flooring. Some types of oven were
constructed to be fuelled by waste oil, as this was the most natural and,
in some respects, the most accessible energy source.
The common slogan was ’those who help themselves …’, and the
approach worked. When one was able to shake off the cold at dawn,
a smile was not far away. On occasions, one was able to make a short
visit to Brussels. Regardless, the aircraft received the necessary main-
tenance, rockets were fitted, and bombs and ammunition loaded. In a
sense, the difficulties were made up for by the results and advances.
Also, the aircraft could reach targets in Germany proper. This signified
that the war had to end soon, but it was not to go quite as smoothly as
everyone had hoped.
The German Ardennes offensive started on 16 December and they
advanced rapidly towards Brussels from the south. The German offens-
ive benefitted from poor weather that significantly limited Allied air
support for its own defence forces. Information about a large gather-
ing of German aircraft arrived, which required increased alertness. The
Allied leadership believed, however, that the Ardennes offensive could
be wound up and continued the pressure eastwards.
89
PART II – The Ground Crews’ Participation in the War on the Continent 1944/45
On 21 December, the Wing was ordered to another airfield, B79 near
Woensdrecht in Holland. At the beginning it was difficult to start all
over again in terms of the ’comfort specialities’ which the season called
for, and by then periods of snowfall had become common. In addition,
another challenge arose. The Wing had hardly arrived, when rumours
spread of a large German force gathering on the north side of the river
Maas. Supposedly, this included paratroopers and SS special forces. The
Allied defence forces in the area were very limited, so the Wing’s own
anti-aircraft artillery unit was assigned to the front along the river.
The day before Christmas, 23 December, the Wing received orders
to be on the alert and establish full readiness. This included, for
instance, having access to weapons at all times, sleeping with one’s
clothes on, all vehicles being ready and loaded to the extent possible,
storage rooms prepared to be destroyed, and so forth. Yet at the same
time, flying operations were to be upheld. A quotation from General
Mehre’s account may serve to give some insight into the situation:
This readiness created a strange atmosphere, especially for those who were preparing
for the Christmas celebration. The chaplain and his closest aides received word to
continue their arrangements, and thereby a situation rose which most people will
probably remember: Christmas dinner with Norwegian food, Christmas presents
and singing as they processed around the decorated Christmas tree, but it has hardly
previously been done singing ’Wonderful is the Earth’, ’Peace on Earth’, with guns
over their shoulders and pistols on their hips.
To put this quotation in a wider context, it should be borne in mind that
the crew was a hardened group. First and foremost, they did their job,
took hardships as they came, and weighed the threats carefully. They
worked together, but could also spend time together. This represents
qualities that mostly say something about the crew themselves. Still, the
characteristics of this enterprise were that the aircraft were dispersed
on the airfield, and the working environment was equally dispersed
and vulnerable. This could have given a sense of isolation and despair.
Therefore, the strain was more an issue based on personal premises than
originating from being part of an organized and armed fighting force.
90
Wilhelm Mohr. On World War II
The reason for the ordered readiness was real enough. If the Ger-
man Ardennes offensive continued as promisingly as it had started, an
additional three German divisions were assembled north of the Maas
and the Rhine, ready to advance towards Antwerp. In addition, the Ger-
man Air Force [Luftwaffe] was not without claws. On 1 January 1945
Allied airfields were attacked by no fewer than 900 aircraft. Strangely,
the Wing escaped from these attacks in remarkably good shape, largely
due to effective camouflage. The previous base at Grimbergen received
its share of the attacks, which led to a German message claiming that
all Norwegian aircraft had been destroyed with a high number of cas-
ualties and wounded.
B79 also became a concern for another reason, as the German V-1
was primarily aimed at the Allied possibility of receiving logistic support
through Antwerp. The later V-2 could also be seen on the horizon. This
did not affect the Wing since it went straight up, but it was dreadful to
think of the devastation in London. On the other hand, the V-1, with
its characteristic and piercing serrated pulse, which suddenly stopped,
and flew straight over the airfield. During night-time all one could do
was to count and hope, and there was little comfort in telling oneself
that the real target was Antwerp. After a while, the V-1 line of fire over
our heads became rather unbearable, and also irrational. It was necess-
ary to bring the V-1 down before it reached Antwerp, but at the same
time impose defence limitations due to the airfield, damage to aircraft,
and so forth.
On 20 February the next airstrip at B85 Schjindel was ready.
Although arriving there was a relief, new problems arose. A short while
after arrival, British forces directed their attack against the Möhne
Dam. After this, the river rose to a level that flooded the tents, messes,
and runway. However, that episode also turned out well ultimately. At
Schjindel the Dutch 332 Squadron was also [in addition to the British
No. 66 fighter squadron] attached to the Norwegian Wing.
The direction of the war became clear. The Ardennes offensive had led
to a counter-offensive, in which American forces simultaneously had
crossed the Rhine. Despite huge losses, British, American and Canadian
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forces established themselves in the Maas-Rhine area further north.
The operations thus continued with undiminished force, even though
it was just a matter of time before Germany was forced to capitulate.
Intense flying operations were performed, with heavy losses, while the
ground crew contributed with all the professionalism and discipline that
marks a well-tuned apparatus.
B106 at Twente in the north-east of the Netherlands was to be the
Wing’s last airfield. Traffic was organized so that the convoy route
partly went through German areas. Naturally, this was a significant
encouragement. Troublesome thoughts undoubtedly began to surface
for large numbers of the personnel: What would happen when Ger-
many capitulated? What about Norway? In what manner would the
journey home be performed? Would German forces entrench them-
selves?
Thoughts of home had been vital on many occasions. They evolved
around a number of issues, many focussed on personal issues that had
been suppressed due to preoccupation with work, risks and advances.
Still, they were tiresome thoughts. Yet despite all, one was happy to have
been able to contribute during the war, but when it was over, then what?
Such thoughts started to recur more frequently: Would there be fight-
ing in Norway, and if so, what would that mean for those back home?
The authorities in London had been concerned by the above-men-
tioned issues, too. They had to focus especially on the role that Nor-
wegian forces would play if the German forces were to entrench
themselves. The results of the Government’s considerations were prep-
arations that involved the Wing. The last day of operations for the two
Norwegian squadrons on the Continent was 21 April.
Thereafter followed a transfer of command and a separation of the
two other squadrons, the British 66 and the Dutch 322, that had joined
the Norwegian force. The Squadrons and the Norwegian ground crews
were able to begin their journey as early as 24 April, and the Wing was
back in England on 26 April 1945. More than eight months had passed
since the transfer to the fighting zone and the Continent. A long win-
ter lay between the embarkation and the transfer back to England.
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132 (N) Wing’s equipment on its way to Normandy.
Cleaning the weapons was an important maintenance task. Hans Olai Elveness with the
cleaning rod, and Johansen seated under the aircraft. Asked to comment the picture, Mohr








War in Europe had been raging for six months when the German
attack on Norway was launched on 9 April 1940. Admittedly, it was an
imaginative and bold enterprise. The potential of air power demon-
strated itself. Norwegian forces were unable to repel the invasion, nor
could British expeditionary forces, aided by French and Polish forces,
maintain their positions given the looming threat in Europe. The cam-
paign lasted until 7 June, when evacuation from North Norway took
place.
It should be noted that there were more British than Norwegian
soldiers killed during the 1940 Norway campaign, and the French and
Polish forces also suffered losses. Added to this were the significant
losses of merchant and naval sailors at sea – notably the aircraft carrier
HMS Glorious with a ship’s company of about 1,500 all ranks, only 39
of whom survived. In addition, there was a Royal Air Force squadron
of Hurricanes on board that had previously so gallantly operated from
Bardufoss, and on evacuation had managed, so conspicuously, to land
all its aircraft on the carrier.
In Britain, the War brought Churchill to the helm. The nation
braced itself for whatever the future might bring.
For Norway, the War was not over. HMS Devonshire had safely taken
both HM King Haakon and his government to Britain, as well as the
remnants of trained naval and air force personnel, now impatiently hop-
ing for any available opportunity to play their part in the war effort.
At this time northern France was overrun. German forces were
poised for the invasion of Britain. I am reminded here of Churchill’s
words, ’that crisis is the moment of opportunity’. These words were as
encouraging to us as Norwegians as they were to all the British.
The Norwegian ambition was clearly to establish an identifiable
national contribution to the War effort as quickly as possible. To this
end the Norwegian Merchant Fleet was already operating with a signifi-
cant number of modern ships with good capacity, of which the tanker
fleet, in particular, filled an essential requirement. After training in
Canada, Norwegian naval and air force units were rapidly formed and
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deployed respectively to Royal Navy and Royal Air Force operational
control. In addition, elements of the Army were gathered in Scotland,
to support the growing resistance movement within occupied Norway.
Norway truly became an ally to Britain.
We can claim, with some pride, that the income from our merchant
fleet funded our share of the War effort. However, at the same time we
must recognise our good fortune that, during the period when Britain
stood alone, the battle of Britain had been won with no invasion taking
place.
My own luck was to be part of ’the Norses’ within Fighter Com-
mand. This comprised of two squadrons, 331 and 332, totalling about
300 pilots and ground crew. Besides our training camp ’Little Nor-
way’ in Canada, we also had two squadrons in Costal Command and
numerous crews in Bomber Command and ferry Command, as well as
crews on the ferry link to Sweden under the auspices of the civil airline
BAOC.
I was in my early twenties at the time, but vividly recall when, in May
1942, the two fighter squadrons were moved from Scotland and the
north of England to RAF Station North Weald near Epping. There we
were to meet our Wing Leader-to-be, David Scott-Malden, a classics
scholar from Winchester and King’s College and now proven in combat
from the Battle of Britain. He had been in part responsible for getting
us south and knew what was in store for us. It was he who really coac-
hed us in the ways of the RAF and introduced us to the realms of aerial
combat that were to follow.
The Station Commander at one time, Douglas A. G. Morris (or
’Zulu’ as we called him) later gave an account of our association:
The Norses were possibly the easiest of all Allies to handle. Their sense of humour
– or sense of the ridiculous – and their reaction to any form of pomposity was eas-
ily understood and accepted. They all spoke more or less fluent English, and when
British and Norwegians were together it was only by the different insignias on our
uniform that strangers could tell us apart (from Laddie Lucas’s Wings of War,
1985).
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On this latter point of language and acceptance, I may add that we
soon learned the value of a small ’Sir’ at the end of crucial senten-
ces.
Whilst the RAF Station was our true home, we also got a feeling for
the strengths and character of individuals in the local population. We
benefited from the consideration and appreciative spirit carried forward
from the time when Churchill would offer ’nothing but blood, tears
and sweat’. As part of the Royal Air Force we were readily accepted and
treated as equals. I am confident that my fellow compatriots in the navy
and the Army had similar experiences.
This feeling of integration was brought home to me directly one eve-
ning at our local pub in Epping, when a stranger just came up to me,
undid his lucky ’grout’ from his wristband and gave it to me saying that
I needed it more than he did. Then he just made off, probably to avoid
the embarrassment of my protesting or of the offer of thanks.
We had an unflinching faith in the RAF’s leadership. We had the
best of equipment and training and we shared real comradeship. We
were indeed a privileged group. Despite all the losses we suffered, the
opportunity of being useful gave us deep inner satisfaction.
By the time of the Allied invasion, the RAF was keen for us to partici-
pate. As a result, a Norwegian Tactical Wing was formed, fully mobile
and counting about 750 personnel of all branches and ranks. We felt
trusted. We also felt, modestly, as is the Norwegian way (!), that we had
accounted for ourselves.
From ’D’ Day through the fighting and moving forward to the
Dutch-German border when the War came to an end on 8 June 1945,
the relationship between the RAF and the ’Norses’ had only deepened.
The equality, consideration and recognition of the merits shown at all
times to us by the RAF was appreciated by our aircrews and ground
crews alike.
Our eventual return to Norway was an endless joy. HMS Devonshire
returned to Oslo with the King exactly five years to the day after leav-
ing. Norway was a reunited nation, though conditions and circum-
stances had kept us apart for those five years. Now followed the task of
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rebuilding the nation. Normal life regained its stride. New generations
have followed on, It is therefore important that we Norwegians should
remember that Britain stood up at the crucial time and that it was the
Allied victory that brought us our country back. But we had participated
– and we should be thankful for that.
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PART IV




How can I really do justice to a subject such as this?
To the situation we faced on 9 April 1940?
To the final result that brought us our freedom back?
To the many who did not get to experience this freedom?
To those lessons that prevailed, or which perhaps have not prevailed
clearly enough?
Of course, I cannot. But then again, I am not a historian. Of course,
I will be subjective. I choose to be subjective.
I need to place myself and provide an overall picture. In the winter
of 1939/1940 I was Deputy Commander of the Reconnaissance Wing
of Trøndelag Air Unit, a lieutenant, 22 years old, and had just fin-
ished basic Flying School and the Army Academy. We were at Værnes.
The Wing numbered nine Fokker aircraft, a model dating from 1924.
Poland had been occupied, and we were patrolling along the Nor-
wegian coast and territorial waters – in many ways a demanding job
with a single engine and the instruments of those days, and given local
Norwegian winter conditions. However, controlling the shipping was
important and we were a determined crew. The situation in Europe
became gradually worse and involved repercussions for us as well –
brought into focus by the Altmark case.
Were we scared? Not really. Fearful, perhaps, if our thoughts went
in that direction. The thought of actual war seemed too unreal. Yet
the war did come, on the night of 9 April 1940. The first task was to
change our aircraft wheels to skis, and then we flew up to Selbu and
thereafter to Aursunden near Røros, while German aircraft flew over
us in a steady stream to where we had come from. The Fokkers were
not much to put up a fight with. The Gladiators at Fornebu were dif-
ferent – they were fighter aircraft, and the Wing there put up a good
fight.
The flood of rumours was enormous, and already during the same
night Quisling broadcasted his recommendation on the radio. We
heard little from our own side and it was difficult to receive meaningful
contact. I had to take over the Wing as early as the third day. We did
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some flying – with German aircraft constantly over and around us. With
the benefit of hindsight, I would have to characterize the usefulness of
our flying as doubtful. On top of that, we had problems with our supply
of petrol and our aircraft sinking into the rotten snow. Everything did
not go exactly as planned, but our motivation at least could hardly have
been better.
I will not go deeper into the war in South Norway as I experi-
enced it, other than to say that there was a series of events and we
did the best we could. The result was a group of us in a fishing boat
on our way to Scotland, and the city of Molde was burning as we
left.
We know that the war went better in North Norway. They had
had more time and to some extent had managed to gather forces. The
situation showed that the Norwegian soldier in his own territory was
far from inferior. Also at sea, and even our Fokkers up there made
useful contributions. However, our fate was sealed when the Germans
managed to bring their airpower into the area. It made the supply
situation intolerable for the British, even though another priority sur-
faced. Namely, Norwegian volunteer labour helped the Germans to
expand the airfield at Værnes for this purpose – while fighting was
still ongoing. This, too, was an element of Norway at war. Inciden-
tally, more British than Norwegian troops fell on Norwegian soil dur-
ing the war in Norway. The French and Polish also had their fig-
ures.
How could it have happened that we allowed ourselves to be con-
quered by approximately 11,000 troops, brought forward in the first
phase? This was a disgrace, and a self-inflicted disgrace too, because it
should not have happened and it did not need to have happened. In his
book, General Ruge claims that if we had been prepared we could have
thrown the enemy back to sea. Ruge is clear and to the point in argu-
ing that we were not prepared. We now know that in their attack plan
the Germans were ready to abort their attack if they were to lose their
element of surprise, yet we provided no such grounds.
We do not escape history even though it might be familiar enough.
It has so many lessons to provide that we have to live with a certain
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element of repetition. Guttorm Hansen35 once said that ’it was a fear of
committing ourselves – we thought we could steer clear – we were still people
living on the outskirts, despite the experiences with the losses of the Merchant
Fleet during WWI. In a way the reality of the world had not yet become our
reality’. Nordahl Grieg36 states: ’we built upon peace almost in defiance’. He
idealizes us. Rather, it could be argued that, with closed eyes and switc-
hed off senses, we clung to peace as almost in defiance.
I am not one of those who blame the Labour Party for all that hap-
pened leading up to 9 April. We have a society, such as it is, and that
was the case back then as well, but it should not have got off too eas-
ily either. The consequences were too grave for that, and many of our
lessons learned are bound to this particular phase.
The inter-war period had seen a social development of our society
that I do understand. There had been high unemployment rates for a
significant period of time. The Labour Party’s representatives had been
elected on a platform of economic crisis and social politics, and not
because of defence matters or foreign policy credentials. The down-
sizing of our Defence Forces was a declared policy, and the Mot Dag
movement was influential. Scepticism towards everything military, and
towards officers in particular, was deep. There was a perception that
funding defence-related objectives was not only non-productive and
unnecessary, but also stood in direct contrast to the broader develop-
ment of our society that would bring hope for the future. There was
a prevailing sense that this view had support from the majority of the
elected members of Parliament. So the way for such a political agenda
was clear when the Labour Party took office in 1935, but we should be
aware that the huge downsizing of the Armed Forces came in the years
1932 and 1934, during the Mowinckel- and Hundseid administrations
35 Guttorm Hansen was an author, and also a Labour Party member of the Norwegian Par-
liament. He was Stortingspresident (President of the Norwegian Parliament) 1973–1981.
36 Johan Nordahl Brun Grieg (1902–1943) was a famous Norwegian journalist, author and
poet. He was granted the possibility to join an Allied bombing mission in late 1943, and
was subsequently killed during this mission when the Germans shot down his Lancaster
over Berlin on 2 December 1943.
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– with the precondition of reversing the process should warnings from
the continent come as a product of ’a foreseeable foreign policy’.
There was a line of thinking throughout this period that the leader-
ship of our Defence Forces lacked influence, and there was no desire
that it should have any. For instance, the Defence Council, which had
been established as part of the downsizing process, had been activated
for the last time in 1937, and thereafter closed down. A joint Intelli-
gence Service, an initiative from the Defence Forces to, among other
things, enable strategic warning, received no support. There were voi-
ces against this political line, but no particular initiatives from any in-
dividual political party.
It should be noted that with the responsibility of government, a desire
to modify the Labour Party’s single-minded anti-military attitude
gradually surfaced. Characteristically, this happened in the younger
segments of the Party, who were less disposed to the fortified attitude
that the military was the protective tool of the middle classes. How-
ever, with all the inherent political heritage involved, this was far from a
light-hearted operation. With regard to Foreign Minister Koht’s state-
ments in Parliament, while they could be clear and disquieting enough
for action, he often added positives that were easy to focus on, and it
is a very human characteristic to grasp a glimpse of the coming dawn,
rather than acknowledge the gravity of an ever-creeping darkness. I will
not pursue this issue any further, tempting though it undoubtedly may
be. Quite simply, the Government felt it could master such situations
that arose by political means alone. Thus, the crisis management was
as it was, and war came.
However, there are a couple of features from this time that I want
to point out because they focus on what was said and not said under
the particular circumstances or, worse still, were never even considered.
Yet, I consider these features to be important. This is because it is
strange to observe how little reaction the very visible growth of national
socialist forces seemed to generate with our elected Members of Parlia-
ment at the time. It is true that voices of resentment and engagement
had arisen within the population, particularly within radical move-
ments, with regard to the civil war in Spain, for instance. However, in
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our domestic political debate the war was simply narrowed down to a
power struggle between the Great Powers, which it was better to stay
out of. One did not appear to even glance towards a conclusion either
– as if a winning side with democratic ideals as opposed to a totalitarian
rule was of little significance to us. This may suggest a lack of charac-
ter in the matter, or perhaps a kind of cowardice. After all, we knew
England and they knew us, so that was ’tolerable’, but we needed to
be careful with Germany. The political position of neutrality had got
us through last time [i.e. WWI], when we had benefited from indirect
protection. This time, we also had the League of Nations to lean on.
The second issue is of a different character, and is related to the
nature of politics versus what is really in the deeper interests of a society.
Again, it feels strange to observe the political debate and the distinct
lack of understanding of what one was willing to put our young people
through if, despite everything, our society needed to call on them. I
want to emphasize this point, as this is the issue I am least inclined to
forgive our then nation’s political leadership. Other parties must also
shoulder their part of this burden.
When it comes to the war in Norway, I do not share the uncon-
ditional sense of the Government’s greatness that has been expressed
elsewhere. When, early in the morning of 9 April 1940, Foreign Min-
ister Koht dismissed the German envoy, and the Government did their
part accordingly, a healthy national response was displayed. Unfortu-
nately, this was not followed up in a manner that our Defence Forces
needed, because is it not the case that the Defence Forces are subser-
vient to the political will? The fact that the people were also forgotten
and Quisling had his chance is a separate matter.
The sinking of Blucher at Oscarsborg [just south of Oslo], which
provided room to manoeuvre, and the efforts of C. J. Hambro, both
ensured the element of choice. The fact that the situation was debated
within the political circles, by then at Hamar, was only natural. This was
the moment when Nygårdsvold realized his perceived reality had been
shattered, felt the gravity of a failed policy, and wished to be relieved
of further governmental duties. It was, however, the Government that
late at night in Elverum recommended that the Parliament conduct
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negotiations with the Germans, and suggested a three-man body for
that purpose. The Government received Parliament’s backing. It also
received the so-called ’Elverum’s-Authority’.37
On 10 April the armed skirmishes at Midtskogen [close to Elverum,
north of Oslo] had yet again provided the Government with a breathing
space. Once again, the German ultimatum to surrender was received,
but that time also with the provision that Quisling should be installed
as Head of the Government. The Government responded negatively,
which was somewhat remarkable in a situation that was continually
deteriorating. The natural reflex of the first ’no’ was no longer the case.
Much had already been lost and there was little hope. Was it an instinct
from the inner depths that prevailed? At the same time, the attitude
of the King seems unequivocal – notably his role within constitutional
limitations, and how, by his unique leadership, he still managed to exer-
cise his influence. There is greatness over the decision that was to have
such widespread consequences. Hence, we do not need to forget what
sound attitudes and actions could have spared the nation. I will leave it
at that. In any case, it was, to quote Stephan Zweig, ’History’s eternal
moment’. Our history’s eternal moment.
On a personal level, I came to England, where gradually more Nor-
wegian personnel gathered with time. Our hope was to receive new
material and go to North Norway. This soon turned out to be imposs-
ible. The Government and a defence leadership established themselves
in London. The attitude was somewhat reactive, as the future appeared
uncertain: What if Germany were to win? The Navy experienced a ’No’
to participating with fitted vessels for the evacuation at Dunkerque.
The Royal Air Force needed pilots for the looming showdown. On our
part, a training camp was established in Canada. When we left it felt
like we were taking the water buckets with us while the barn was almost
37 In Norwegian: `Elverumsfullmakten’. With the Prime Minister, the Government and
members of the Norwegian Parliament trying to escape the German attack on 9 April 1940,
Elverumsfullmakten was an authority that empowered the Government to act on behalf of
Parliament until Parliament was able to convene once again. The Norwegian Parliament
did not formally convene until after WWII.
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on fire. At least, this was the case for the pilots of my age; the Engl-
ish will have to express their own reaction themselves. A Norwegian
military agreement with Great Britain was first established on 26 May
1941, when Trygve Lie took over as Foreign Minister. Much came out
of the so-called ’Camp Little Norway’, by the way. It became a beacon
of recruitment and in an admirable tempo we had our four Norwegian
Squadrons established and put into operational duty in Iceland, Scot-
land and southern England. Yet what would have happened if the Royal
Air Force had not won the Battle of Britain?
For my part, I ended up in one of the two Norwegian fighter squadrons.
These were put under the operational command of the RAF, and it was
a privileged group that was given the opportunity to retaliate against
the enemy. There was no uncertainty or doubt; we had top material
and we had ourselves. The tasks and usefulness gave deep satisfaction,
whereas the gratitude towards allied friends is trivial. The latter took
losses too, for their own sake and for ours.
Is it strange, then, that it is the contrast between this and the ex-
periences from Norway that is the most glaringly obvious? The War
could have shown many positive sides at home, even impressive ones
during the least favourable conditions. Yet there were also some aspects
that were anything but good. For instance the work on Værnes airfield
already mentioned, and later the notions of ’the cooperative line’38 at
home in Norway, in its various forms and shapes, and also the presi-
dency that wanted to remove the King, and so forth – it was not easy.
As previously mentioned, even in England we experienced Norwegian
political hesitation, and the less contact with this environment the bet-
ter. The King, yes, but that was about it. And therefore the King’s loy-
alty to the Government was both admired and respected. What would
the Norwegian foothold have been like without him?
However, this did not preclude us from seeing positive sides as well.
The Merchant Fleet was followed with respect and admiration, and
38 In Norwegian: `samarbeidslinjen’.
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we were able to witness our own growth, and similarly for the Navy.
We were both flexible forces that were provided with room to grow.
The Army became more immobile, but it had its groups operating on
the domestic front. Particularly encouraging were messages of a grow-
ing upsurge in morale back home in Norway, rooted in the population
itself, and also of the physical resistance that was gradually growing.
This gave respect and hope for the future – to the extent that we actu-
ally thought of a future. It gave a growing sense of recognition towards
the leadership of the Home Front and the Government in their com-
mon work for a united liberation process. Everything was fine as long
as we were able to continue our work where we were, and fortunately
we were given the opportunity to participate in the Allied invasion on
the Continent.
The end was crowned with victory. Our homecoming is impossible
to describe – a meeting with forces that in their own way had made their
sacrifices for freedom, a meeting with a society matured in respect and
in confidence in the role of the individual in a common destiny, and so
many, many other things. Yet from this atmosphere of victory we should
also remember that:
– It was not we who gave us our country back. It was the Allied victory
that brought us that, but we participated and should be grateful for
that.
– It was not we who led the liberation process. It was the Allied stra-
tegy that ensured that, but we played our role and should be grate-
ful for that too.
At this point I must allow myself to go beyond the period of war and
the lessons learned from occupation. What lessons have been learned?
It is only reasonable, I guess, that I limit myself to the business of the
Defence Forces.
None of us abroad had thought that the Government would escape
a legal inquiry. This is not to say that we wanted it, but merely that
it was something natural and inevitable. That Nygårdsvold and Koht
would fail court marshals was not an unlikely scenario at the time. As
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we now know, Parliament chose not to indict the Government. In C.
J. Hambro’s words: ’they did the best they could. In that lies their excuse,
and in that lies their sentence’. The issue at hand was quite simply that
the Government, as far as the general population was concerned, had
gradually contributed adequately; it was a time to stop looking back
and a time to look forward. In any case, the liberation seemed to
unplug a sense of ’go ahead’ spirit and optimism that called upon for-
midable forces. The Labour Party was able to stay at the helm. There
was plenty to do, but everything was run down, and it may be useful
to remember the Marshall Plan aid that helped us through the initial
hardships.
The Armed Forces received their share of attention, despite the fact
that few could envision a conflict situation in the near future. Perhaps a
degree of guilty conscience contributed to this, but also the fact that the
Armed Forces acquired an authoritative political leadership. Further,
our recent experiences had fortified recognition of the Armed Forces’
stature and roots in our society. The sense of an overall unity among
the political and military leadership structure was strengthened, among
other things through a common intelligence service. We became fam-
iliar with the concept of ’total defence’,39 with its elements of society’s
readiness for crisis and war, and in that way assisted in a more thorough
and lengthy political decision-making process. We were able to keep
our system of conscription. We gained our Home Guard and various
defence-supportive organizations, such as Folk og Forsvar, Kvinners
Frivillige Beredskap, Norges Forsvarsforening, and Norges Lottefor-
bund.
However, the sense of the ’cloudless sky’ or ’we do not have any
enemies’ did not last for long. Soon, the tense situation following the
Soviet Union’s march into Czechoslovakia arose. Norway picked up the
ties woven during WWII and joined the Western defence organisation
NATO. We had our very own Royal Resolution of 10 June 1949: ’Di-
rectives for military personnel and military commanders if an armed
39 In Norwegian: ’Totalforsvar’.
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attack on Norway occurs’40 – known as ’The Poster on the Wall’41. This
was an unusually important document that expressed confidence and
related directly to the situation that paralysed our Defence Forces in
the initial critical moments of 9 April. Also, we had our alert laws – no
one can claim that we did not wake up and try to learn from our hard-
earned, and still fresh, experiences.
I do not want to pursue the further development, or enter the cur-
rent security- and defence policy debate. We have a solid Defence
Force. Lessons and experiences have been learned and implemented
fairly well. Yet when it comes to rooting our Defence Forces in broader
society we no longer appear to have sufficient focus. This is particu-
larly related to our concern for what we might ask from our troops. I
have previously noted that this responsibility failed in the period before
WWII, but was then equally corrected after the War. Since then time
has elapsed, and the world continues to change and offer both possi-
bilities and responsibilities which we all seem to benefit from. We find
new participants in our political arena, with ideas and aspirations, and
ambitions. But also participants that are distanced from those clear
lessons we have learned, with little personal understanding of the true
reality and nature of war. This is the nature of things.
The demand for a conscript system is built upon the Defence Force’s
duty to protect land and people. It is as simple as that, and the mutu-
ality in that relationship is self-evident. It is our young people that we
call upon. Since the War, the term ’the expanded security concept’42 has
emerged, with the Defence Forces as ’a security policy instrument’.43 In
today’s situation we see our conscripts being sent to places under con-
ditions that can be as unclear to them and their leaders as they are for
those who send them: peace keeping, or perhaps peace enforcing op-
erations – do we recognise the difference? The question is not about
40 In Norwegian: ’Direktiver for militære befalingsmenn og militære sjefer ved væpnet angrep på
Norge’.
41 In Norwegian: `Plakaten på Veggen’.
42 In Norwegian: `Det utvidede sikkerhetsbegrep’.
43 In Norwegian: `Et sikkerhetspolitisk instrument’.
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loyalty, and I am not saying that we should not contribute in this man-
ner, which one day might also benefit ourselves. We want the individu-
als to volunteer – if we can say how voluntary such decisions are in a
coherent group. The question becomes how society’s deeper interests
can be reconciled with what we wish and hope for, politically – whe-
ther we want it first and foremost, and if so, whether this responsibility
has been made sufficiently explicit for each individual, for the Defence
Forces altogether, and not least for those family and friends who watch
their loved ones being sent abroad. These are fundamental questions
that we cannot afford to let go unanswered. It is in the interests of our
society in its broadest sense, and very much a relevant topic that should
be debated more than ever before. Further, if this is the case, it is a dis-
turbing sign that security and defence policy were apparently of such
distinct subordinate interest during the last elections. This was also the
case before the War …
It is not my intention to end on a pessimistic note. The events of 9
April made clear what the Fatherland really means. If I were to apportion
any glory to those times, I would give it to the many who, despite all
uncertainty, found their real selves, and mobilized with everything that
involves – not stemming from an order or a sense of duty, but as an
answer to an inner obligation. I will not let this happen. The same re-
action will undoubtedly be seen again, and when it does, let us ensure
that reasonable conditions are given, both for the task that is expected
to be met, as well as for those individuals called to fulfil it.
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PART V
An address to the Royal Norwegian Air Force
Academy on the fifty-year anniversary of the
Royal Norwegian Air Force
By Wilhelm Mohr
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First of all, I would like to thank you for the invitation here today, and
at the same time thank you for pointing towards one of us elderly to
mark our service’s fifty-year anniversary. We appreciate immensely that
in your efforts to prepare for the future, wish and muster the will to
bring the past with you.
The Royal Resolution of 10 November 1944 begins in a direct man-
ner: ’Until Stortinget [Parliament] chooses to decide otherwise, the Air
Force is established as the third armed service, in which, among others,
today’s Army and Naval Air Arm units, personnel and materiel of all
kinds are included’.
Among other things, it states later on: ’When planning and devel-
oping the new service, in close cooperation with the authorities of the
Navy and Army, one shall develop air units that can meet the necessary
demands of naval and land warfare’.
Other amendments in the Resolution have less interest here, but a
work program to see the process through was set as a precondition. As
a matter of fact, I myself have searched for Stortingets [Parliament’s]
follow-up on this Resolution, which was provisional as were other
governmental issues during World War II. I have not found anything
that concerns this issue, which we can conclude means that there was
consensus, in other words that Stortinget [Parliament] supported the
decision. Thus, we can consider 10 November 1944 as a rightful birth-
day. And that is why we are gathered here today.
Well, a birth signifies a step in an evolution. A step from an eventful,
if not a particularly easy past. That given, I can only say that we experi-
enced its pregnancy during the war as quite easy. One could say that it
gradually developed itself almost automatically. If not, we presumably
would still have had a separate Army and Naval Air Arm. But suddenly
the circumstances had provided us with a new start signal and a new
track for running. We got our training camp in Toronto, as the torch of
recruitment it became, and where joint efforts created the foundation
for further education. The process of further refining the fighting skills
was performed within the Royal Air Force, which already embraced
117
our flying efforts, whether this included operations over the sea or over
land. To master the air arena had proved not only a precondition – but
an absolute – in order to survive, which the Battle of Britain so clearly
had proven. Also, the other services had recognized the potential of the
airplane in terms of its ability to wage war. Our own organization had
risen to become mature fruit.
So, there we were after the war, with a new service, all in all brought
forward by new servicemen, whether they were flying or ground per-
sonnel. Well-seasoned personnel and equally conscious. Some will say
too conscious to adjust to the rebuilding of the national defence forces
that we faced.
I believe it is appropriate that we remember the many, very many,
that never returned home. Much could be said with regard to each
individual’s vitality, courage and will – so nicely woven into the fellow-
ship by the words of Nordahl Grieg on the service memorial in Oslo:
’Above the kingdom of the dead the air is so inviolably pure. It would
be to breach a friendship if you were to mention a single one’.44
I also believe we should remember the Royal Air Force. This splendid
organization that offered us trust and led us forward; which we right-
fully can regard as godparents to the circumstances we hereby celebra-
tes.
And with this I could say thank you for your attention, say some
nice words on how clever you are and what the service expects of you
– congratulate you and offer you good luck. But you all took a chance
by inviting me. To stop here would hardly be particularly adequate.
Because, if we are to talk about the service fifty years ago, we do not
escape the past I barely touched upon previously. Not because I believe
that time deserves any particular attention in military terms. Nor will
I say that this period, in military terms, added any values which we can
benefit from today. Still, it makes a part of our history.
44 The poem in Norwegian: ’Over de dødes rike står luften ukrenkelig ren. Det vilde være å
bryte et vennskap hvis du vilde nevne en’. From the poem ’Viggo Hansteen’, by Nordahl
Grieg.
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There was the beginning. It was the time of fumbling when most
nation’s navies and armies had their eyes on this innovative instrument.
Could it be used to their advantage, and if so – how? The land forces
quickly used it for reconnaissance and communications in its simplest
form, and likewise for the Navy in order to expand the power of its
artillery: In Norway we were actually quite early in exploiting the field
of torpedoes.
We should not underestimate these efforts. They should be viewed
with the perspective of that time, and there was much uncertainty. The
airplane was still the ’apparatus’ of which it has been said, ’its natural
condition was to be unserviceable, although with knowledge, wisdom
and effort could be brought into the air if only for a short period at a
time’.45 Also, there was the defence political situation at the time, when
limited resources almost invited to protectionist compartmental think-
ing. But let us not be too hard on the past.
That is not the reason why I focus on the pre-war period. It is only to
be aware of the enthusiasts that were there. Enthusiasts from the very
beginning, when flying did not require any other meaning than adven-
ture, courage and also the ambition of human imagination to master
and exploit the new arena in the air that had offered itself. Think about
it: suddenly this opportunity arose after being earthbound throughout
history until then.
In this way the enthusiasts separated themselves from those more
conformist, perhaps best expressed by Bernhard Shaw: ’You see things
as they are and ask why? But I dream things that never were and ask
why not?'.
There was no shortage of dreams, and from the perspective of our
Defence Forces, we can well include the pioneers we know from polar
research and the service of science.
It should hardly come as a surprise that from the enthusiasts a notion
of independence gradually matured. A form of independence towards
45 In Norwegian: ’hvis naturlig tilstand var å være tjenesteudyktig, dog kunne det med kun-
nen, kløkt og strev bli brakt i luften om enn bare for kortere tid ad gangen’.
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the skies in the same way the Army had towards territory and the Navy
at sea.
Independence not only in terms of mastering the craftsmanship of
flying and all technical assistance of the like. But also independence in
terms of thinking on how to organize and use airpower. It was on the
basis of this – in 1936, while shimmers of clouds were gathering on
the horizon – that Colonel Ruge,46 then Army Chief-of-Staff, could
develop a plan for establishing a united Air Force. The lack of an Air
Force felt pressing – an Air Force where airplanes and ground-based air
defence would supplement each other, with an integrated surveillance
service. But the plan from Colonel Ruge went much further than that.
For the first time one could see a clear strategic thought of how a united
Air Force could be organized and used. Not only could an Air Force be
used as point and regional defence, but also for reconnaissance and the
inherent offensive ability to strike the enemy’s base area and invasion
targets.
The enthusiasts had influenced this process. There were critical voi-
ces, of course. Conformist attitudes will always be on the alert. But
when this suggestion of a unified Air Force was stopped it was probably
more due to the heavy expenditure this would include, together with the
societal and security policy development at the time, when hopeful trust
and political manoeuvring to ensure our nations security held a higher
currency than to meet the demands of our Defence Forces. When some
time later, one rather extraordinarily decided to buy aircraft – it was too
late.
In retrospect, we must allow ourselves to reflect upon what role and
impact German airpower had on the attack on Norway 9 April 1940.
We know the effect on Poland, but considering the distance to Norway,
and with the build-up and organization Ruge’s air plan contained, it is at
least my perception that the entire German enterprise would have been
46 Refers to Otto Ruge, who Mohr later met for one hour close to Otta when Ruge had
become the Commanding General for the Norwegian Defence Forces, and who shortly
thereafter was appointed Norwegian Chief of Defence.
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perceived by the Germans themselves to be too extensive and risky to
even have been started in the first place. We also know that confronted
with the German airpower, the British naval forces – and with that the
forces set to help us – had to withdraw, first in South Norway and later
in the North.
I also feel we should cover the period after the War. There we were,
as a unified service, fortified, tested and reputable. Reputable externally
by the results during the war which everyone could see, but also intern-
ally, with all the complex contributions performed during that very en-
deavour.
It is not for me to repeat the evolution of the Air Force. After the sen-
sations of liberation and demobilization, the Iron Curtain descended,
and with that a wild race of weapons aids, infrastructure, alert measu-
res, and such. Our service was certainly provided room to manoeuvre,
with the strength of our youth and a technology that kept exceeding
its perceived boundaries. In addition to fighter aircraft for air defence
and their tactical use, maritime aircraft were added with increasingly
autonomous roles. Helicopters forced themselves into various military
and civil societal tasks. Our transport capacity grew to an entirely new
dimension. Rocket defence was established, and with that the Light Air
Defence. Innovative electronics kept pushing their limits and opened
new perspectives.
Oh, how we rode in that race. Who could expect that our growth
would continue without tension within the defence community? Is this
not always the case when technological innovations hit a new market? I
will not say more on this other than acknowledging that the other two
services received us in a manner that primarily signifies trust. We should
give them credit for that. At the same time we should acknowledge the
commitments that follow this. I will also give credit to the Defence
Research Institute. Their contribution to our and all joint planning in
this period can not be exaggerated.
When all this is said, there is one tribute in particular that lies close
to my heart on this occasion. For the growth we have seen has also
another dimension. It is the continuation of the technical foundation
built up during the war. How lucky we were back then, when we really
121
PART V – An address to the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy on the fifty-year anniversary
started from scratch, but already from the beginning were able to re-
cruit a core of motivated and mature servicemen. Mostly they came
from the maritime environment, from the merchant fleet or the fleet
of whalers that came to Scotland, but not home. They were usually a
bit older and more experienced. They bore with them a natural auth-
ority. They became the core of servicemen within the technical branch
in Iceland, Shetland, Woodhaven, North Weald and on the Continent
– what would we have done without them?
Many decided to continue within our service after the war, to contrib-
ute their part in shaping new personnel crews during our rapid growth.
To preserve the culture we hold so dear. A culture of competence and of
responsibility for all individuals involved. A culture to trust. Yes, these
individuals have been with us for many years. Whether they are still
alive or not, let us send them our thoughts.
So, what will the future look like for our service as we are passing
this fifty year milestone in our history? In a time with no imminent
threat, with certain attitudes that bear some resemblance to the atti-
tudes before WWII. It is a concern. But in total – and this issue has
many sides – the Air Force has come out of this rather well. This is
also the conclusion if we look into the future – and it signifies an evol-
ution that hardly has come to an end. Because we can safely presume
that airpower will continue to increase its influence. Other and new
tasks will surface, as well as tasks perceived to be outside the core focus.
This will include both aircraft and helicopters, and who can tell how
future missiles will place themselves in this picture, offering new forms
of usability.
Where does all this lead us? It is not for me to point out any direc-
tions. You are in a better place to do that, who orientate yourselves from
the world that is, and not like me who tends to orientate from the world
that was. In any case, we should allow ourselves to look back on our past
with pride. A fine service. Also a humane service, because even though
it provides variations in tasks, risk and rewards, it emphasizes even more
the demands for mutual understanding, respect and trust. A ’wholly’
mechanism. I guess you have to be within the service in order to fully
comprehend the contents of this form of discipline. But like all mech-
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anisms it demands nurturing and care. Each of you probably feel the
responsibility – but allow me still on this occasion to narrow this down
to one word: quality. Continued undisputable quality, for ourselves, but
also clearly visible within the Defence Forces as a whole, within our
society, for our Allied friends. Whatever the future may hold, quality
will always create a safe route. Quality is also a goal in itself – a key to
inspiration and job satisfaction – and thereby contributing to safety.
This being said, the remaining part is what I most want to say to you
here at the Air Force Academy. The enthusiasts. Take good care of your
enthusiasm and what it stands for, curiosity, inspiration and the cre-
ative. I pointed to the enthusiasts before the War. How lucky we were
during the War. We were able to recruit personnel with a broad variety
of backgrounds, all with motivation from within themselves, who pro-
duced results whatever the job threw at them, who stood for attitudes
and conduct we could not live without. The enthusiasts are a gift to
each and everyone.
My first message therefore goes to the Academy: Let the attending
officers learn what they need, let them develop and unfold – and use
them – but do not tame them too much. Free enthusiasts. It is from
them this service will acquire its resilience.
My second message goes to each of you, as you grow into this ser-
vice. Or perhaps it is rather an experience in life which has given me
joy and usefulness, and I therefore want to share with you. It came to
me as learning from a slightly older RAF officer – well known to us
Norwegians – as we stood together on an airfield in Holland at the
end of the war. What would come after the war? Our thoughts could
wander into so many subjects. He was a ’regular’, and I remember well
what he said: if you stay in this service there will always be challen-
ges to you personally, from the elements, from the technical appar-
atus, from technology itself with innovations that will introduce them-
selves. And you will deal with young people who are competent. That
will be inspiring. Then this advice came in addition. Remember, he
said, if you stay and with time will deal with these people, procedures
or such – ask yourself what you yourself thought in a similar situation
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when you were their age. That has been a useful exercise, I can assure
you.
With this I wish each of you good luck. One more thing: believe me,
it is a good feeling to have a profession that is useful to your country.
Let us all wish our service the best of luck for the future.
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